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ABSTRACT
An extensive literature documents the instrumental role of early childhood in improving
individuals’ life chances. This dissertation consists of three connected chapters that study
the effects of early childhood circumstances on human capital formation and its economic
consequences.
The first chapter examines the impact of family size on children’s long-term wellbeing. The
number of siblings is a prominent aspect of childhood family environments that affects
parental time and resource investments. Leveraging temporal and county-level variation
in access to abortion in the United States during the 1970s, my research design contrasts the
adult outcomes of children born just before an abortion clinic became available with the adult
outcomes of children born in counties in which abortion remained difficult to obtain. The
results suggest that access to abortion decreases the completed number of younger siblings.
As their parents avoided unplanned children and achieved smaller family sizes, the children
experienced significant improvements in their long-run outcomes, including increased educa-
tional attainment, greater labor-force participation, and higher neighborhood quality. The
effects also appear to complement the benefits of safety net programs. These findings imply
large, persistent returns to reproductive health policies that promote smaller families.
The second chapter, with Martha Bailey and Brenden Timpe, evaluates the long-run effects
of Head Start using large-scale, restricted 2000-2013 Census data linked to date and place of
birth in the Social Security Administration’s Numident file. Using the county-level roll-out
of Head Start between 1965 and 1980 and state age-eligibility cutoffs for school entry, we
find that childhood participation in Head Start is associated with increases in adult human
xiii
capital and economic self-sufficiency, including a 0.29-year increase in schooling, a 2.1-percent
increase in high-school completion, an 8.7-percent increase in college enrollment, and a 19-
percent increase in college completion. These estimates imply sizable, long-term returns to
investing in large-scale preschool programs.
The third chapter, with Wanchuan Lin and Juan Pantano, investigates one underlying mech-
anism behind the birth order effects on various individual outcomes, with later-born children
faring worse than their siblings. We leverage U.S. data on pregnancy intention to study the
role of unwanted fertility in the observed birth order patterns. We document that children
higher in the birth order are much more likely to be unwanted, in the sense that they were
conceived at a time when the family was not planning to have additional children. Being an
unwanted child is associated with negative life-cycle outcomes as it implies a disruption in
parental plans for optimal human capital investment. We show that the increasing preva-
lence of unwantedness across birth order explains a substantial part of the documented birth
order effects in education and employment. Consistent with this mechanism, we document
no birth order effects in families who have more control over their own fertility.
xiv
CHAPTER I
Less is More: How Family Size in Childhood Affects
Long-Run Human Capital and Economic Opportunity
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of family size on children’s long-term wellbeing. The num-
ber of siblings is a prominent aspect of childhood family environments that affects parental
time and resource investments. Leveraging temporal and county-level variation in access
to abortion in the United States during the 1970s, my research design contrasts the adult
outcomes of children born just before an abortion clinic became available with the adult
outcomes of children born in counties in which abortion remained difficult to obtain. The
results suggest that access to abortion decreases the completed number of younger siblings.
As their parents avoided unplanned children and achieved smaller family sizes, the children
experienced significant improvements in their long-run outcomes, including increased educa-
tional attainment, greater labor-force participation, and higher neighborhood quality. The
effects also appear to complement the benefits of safety net programs. These findings imply
large, persistent returns to reproductive health policies that promote smaller families.
JEL Codes: J13, J24, I2
1
[T ]he shift from couples having large families and making small investments in
their children to having small families and making large investments in their
children is one of the fundamental dimensions of economic development.
– David Lam, The Population Association of America Presidential Address, 2011
1.1 Introduction
From 1960 to 2017, the average number of children per U.S. woman fell from 3.7 to 1.8.1
This rapid transition to smaller families is associated strongly with improvements in chil-
dren’s education and economic outcomes. Theoretical work in economics suggests that family
size influences parental investment and, therefore, “child quality” (Becker, 1960; Becker and
Lewis, 1973; Willis, 1973), as well as economic growth (Becker and Barro, 1988). Con-
sequently, policymakers in many countries have implemented policies to influence parents’
decisions regarding the number of children they have. Besides the clearest example from
China’s One Child Policy, countries such as Mexico, India, Colombia, and Indonesia pro-
mote family planning publicly. In the United States, advocates of family planning programs
emphasize family size as a crucial determinant of child development.
However, little empirical research has shown that family size has a causal effect on children’s
lifetime outcomes. The major challenge is the endogeneity of family size, which is potentially
correlated with omitted variables.2 Recent studies rely on instrumental variables, using
arguably exogenous sources of variation in family size due to twinning (Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 1980) or the sex composition of existing children (Angrist and Evans, 1998). Yet
these pioneering strategies provide remarkably inconclusive evidence on the effects of family
1Total fertility rates according to OECD (2019), Fertility rates (indicator). doi: 10.1787/8272fb01-en
(Accessed in June 2019)
2Numerous studies find that smaller families are associated with better child outcomes, but such descrip-
tive studies are subject to potential omitted variable problems. See Schultz (2005) for a review of these
studies.
2
size on child outcomes (Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser, 2010).3 A separate strand of literature
evaluates the effects of reproductive health policies more generally, but such evaluations
do not disentangle the family size effect from the selection effect. For instance, extensive
literature documents improved cohort characteristics after abortion legalization, including
education and economic outcomes, but attributes such gains largely to the fact that children
are more likely to be born into families with more advantageous environments after abortion
was legalized. However, what these estimates truly reflect is the combined influence of the
selection channel and an effect through family size.4 More than 50 years after the onset of
America’s most recent demographic transition, the size and sign of the effects of family size
on children remain poorly understood.
This paper provides new evidence on the long-run effects of family size by exploiting the
staggered roll-out of U.S. abortion clinics. Using information on the number of abortion
service providers between 1970 and 1979, I show that abortion service availability varied
considerably by county. This staggered introduction at the county level provided an exoge-
nous shock to family size for cohorts born before the roll-out. Using an event-study empirical
strategy, I show that children born just before abortion became accessible experienced signif-
icant reductions in their number of younger siblings relative to children born where abortion
remained difficult to obtain. The effect is stronger when less time has elapsed between the
birth and the abortion clinic’s launch and not driven by selection on family environments.
My results show that the cohort born immediately before abortion became available had a
family size that was 0.277 smaller on average compared to cohorts without access to abortion
service providers.
3This approach is also applied to study the effects of fertility on women. Researchers have documented
that smaller families increase labor supply for mothers (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
2000).
4Extensive evidence documents such selection and characteristics of the affected ‘marginal child.’ See
Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999) and Ananat et al. (2009). Studies on other policies also experience
similar challenges. Bailey, Malkova and McLaren (2018) simulate the role of selection in family planning and
use a bounding exercise to estimate the quantitative importance of selection and resource effects.
3
Using large-scale Census/ACS data that contain a rich set of adult outcomes linked to ad-
ministrative data that contain date and place of birth, I then examine the long-run wellbeing
of children born into smaller families. I find that on average, decreasing family size by one
child causes the older child to complete 0.146 more years of schooling, reflecting a 1-percent
increase in high school graduation and an 8-percent (2.7 percentage points) increase in col-
lege completion. The gains are driven primarily by men, who experienced a 0.242-year gain
in schooling and a 13.4-percent (4.4 percentage points) increase in college completion as a
result of having one fewer sibling. Gains in human capital also persist as gains in economic
self-sufficiency. Men experienced a 1.4-percent increase in labor supply on the extensive
margin and a 4.5-percent increase in wages. Further, smaller families led to significantly
improved living circumstances in adulthood, measured by a neighborhood quality index that
consisted of family income, home ownership, and the share of children in poverty in the
census tract of residence. In contrast, abortion access had no effect on children born more
than eight years before access, since their chances of having younger siblings were unlikely
to be affected.
This paper is first to exploit and validate within-state variation in abortion access as an
exogenous source of variation in family size. A long-standing concern in the family size
literature is that the available instrumental variables are potentially subject to violations
of the exclusion restriction. Twinning is more common in older mothers. Having twins
also heightens health risks for the babies and mothers and the close spacing between two
children is difficult for parents to cope with. The same-sex instrument affects sex-specific cost
savings, since existing same-gender children might benefit from hand-me-down economies
which offset the family size effect (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000). Such omitted factors
may have unobserved and unclear effects on later outcomes contribute to the imprecision
of existing estimates. My findings suggest that abortion availability has a substantial effect
on children’s family size. Importantly, abortion availability is not associated with family
background variables for these children. Contrary to previous research that suggests lack of a
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detectable family size effect, I find that the reduction of family size induced by abortion access
improves individuals’ human capital and economic self-sufficiency over the lifecycle.
My research design is novel in that it focuses on cohorts born just before abortion service roll-
out, instead of on those born after. A primary conclusion of the existing abortion literature
has been that abortion not only changes family size and resources, but also induces selection
into parenthood and thus influences the composition of children born after the abortion
roll-out (Levine et al., 1996; Gruber, Levine and Staiger, 1999; Malamud, Pop-Eleches and
Urquiola, 2016; Bailey, Malkova and McLaren, 2018), which means even if the resources
available to a family did not change, selection would lead to better outcomes for the average
child. To address this problem, I focus on the cohorts born just before abortion became
available. I find that these existing children were not different in terms of the composition
of their family backgrounds. The roll-out of abortion providers just after they were born,
however, affected their childhood family environment through the number of younger siblings
they had. This isolation allows me to provide direct evidence on the sign and magnitude
of the family size effect. In addition, focusing on pre-abortion cohorts also allows me to
exclude the mechanism of cohort size and birth timing because the size of the cohort should
remain largely unchanged across regions before abortion roll-out, as was parents’ ability to
intentionally time pregnancies.
Large-scale administrative data not only provide the precision to detect potentially small
effects, but they also contain crucial geo-code information at birth and thus allow within-
state analyses. Discussions of existing cross-state studies on abortion legalization have raised
a concern of confounding state-level factors during the 1970s, the same time abortion was
legalized in the United States. Besides various state characteristics that might be trending
differently, the Vietnam War brought significant variation in the hardship deferment for
paternity (Bailey and Chyn, 2020). Establishment and subsequent elimination of deferment
eligibility for paternity during the late 1960s and early 1970s changed the incentives for
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married couples to have children. In this paper, any changes at the state level are accounted
for by the state-by-cohort fixed effects in my empirical model. The effects of family size on
long-run outcomes are identified solely by within-state comparisons.
Besides highlighting the importance of family size in its own right, another contribution of
this paper is that I find interactions between family size and public programs. Investigating
heterogeneity in the effect, I show that a smaller family size during childhood increased
long-run human capital returns to Head Start, a large-scale public preschool program aimed
at reducing poverty. A decrease in family size also improved the effect of Food Stamps on
economic self-sufficiency.
Family size has received broad attention from researchers and policymakers. This paper is
first to assess a causal link running from abortion access to family size, and eventually to
individuals’ lifecycle outcomes. Overall, my estimates suggest a strong, sustained family size
effect on a wide array of long-run outcomes. These findings elucidate the role of reproductive
health policies in promoting human capital and reducing poverty.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces a conceptual framework for
identification of the family size effect. Section 1.3 summarizes prior research and provides
background on access to abortion in the United States. Section 1.4 describes the Census/ACS
and administrative data and presents the empirical model. Section 1.5 presents the results.
Section 1.6 discusses mechanisms and interaction with safety net programs. Section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 Identifying the Family Size Effect: A Conceptual Framework
Access to abortion may have many influences. In this section, I present a conceptual frame-
work that 1) formalizes the distinction between family size and selection effects through
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which abortion legalization might affect cohort characteristics, and 2) motivates an identifi-
cation strategy aiming to isolate the family size effect. This parameterization illustrates the
mechanism and is not imposed during empirical estimation.5
1.2.1 Model Overview
The seminal model from Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973), and Willis (1973) highlights
parents’ endogenous fertility choices and the interrelationship between child quantity and
quality. Following the parametrization of this model described by Mogstad and Wiswall
(2016), consider a unitary household that chooses its number of children, N , and how much
to invest in them to achieve child quality Q. Parents divide their resources between private
consumption, C, and investment in their children to maximize their utility, or:
U(N,Q,C) = [(αNσ + (1− α)Qσ)1/σ]νC1−ν
The elasticity of substitution between child quantity and quality is 1
1−σ . The price of child
quality, p, which specifies a linear child quality production function, is assumed known
to the parents.6 The budget constraint of a household with income I is represented by
I = C + pQ ·N , and is known to the parents.7 The quality of all siblings within a family is
assumed to be equal, despite the well-documented birth order effects (Black, Devereux and
Salvanes, 2005; Lin, Pantano and Sun, 2019), in order to highlight the key mechanism.
Both Q and N are choices, but with any exogenously given N , the locus gives the optimally
chosen child quality Q∗(N). The family size effect is then thought of as the change in the
quality of a child when an exogenous shock increases quantity from N to N + 1.
5A review of the classic quantity-quality model and its extensions appears in the Appendix.
6See Cunha, Elo and Culhane (2013), who relax this assumption.
7This model assumes child quality production technology is linear, in which Q represents both the child
quality outcome and the parental investment in child quality. A potential extension may assume child
outcome Y is a function of parental investment Q.
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Consider the possibility of a pregnancy in excess of the desired family size due to a contra-
ception failure. A household with its ideal family size thus has another pregnancy and makes
subsequent decisions. For household i with ideal family size N∗i , it may end up in one of the
following three scenarios:
1) No extra pregnancy, in which case the utility is:
U(N∗i , Q(N
∗
i ))
2) An extra pregnancy occurs and results in birth, in which case the utility is:
U(N∗i + 1, Q(N
∗
i + 1))
3) An extra pregnancy occurs followed by abortion, in which case the unwanted child is
avoided and the parents have utility:
U(N∗i , Q(N
∗
i ))− A
where A represents the cost of abortion, monetary and non-monetary. This cost is known
after the additional pregnancy is realized 8.
Note that an implicit assumption of this model is that any contraceptive failure when a
household has not yet reached its ideal family size is simply treated as mistimed. It repre-
sents a planned pregnancy that will be kept, and does not lead to a permanent, additional
birth.9 It also assumes, for simplicity, that there can only be a maximum of one excess
birth. Intuitively, couples become more careful and act to eliminate the possibility of future
8Another option is to give the child up for adoption, which, similarly, maintains the existing family size
at some cost to the parents.
9Suboptimal timing, particularly when pregnancy happens sooner than expected, may also affect parental
utility and child outcomes (Nguyen, 2018).
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contraceptive failures once they have experienced their first unwanted pregnancy.10
Parents choose abortion when:
U(N∗i , Q(N
∗
i ))− U(N∗i + 1, Q(N∗i + 1)) > A (1.1)
that is, when the utility loss due to an extra child is large enough and parents’ willingness
to avoid it outweighs the cost of abortion.
By definition, ‘willingness to avoid’ equals the decrease of utility when exceeding the opti-
mal family size by one, which is tied to the parameters in the household utility function.
For example, families with greater σi in their utility function (i.e., greater elasticity of sub-
stitution between quantity and quality) have lower decreases in utility moving from N∗ to
N∗ + 1. The intuition is that parents with high elasticity find it easier to compensate for
the unexpected change in quantity by adjusting quality, and those with low elasticity are
affected more severely and are more likely to choose abortion given the same cost.
Let σA represent the cutoff σ such that the willingness to avoid equals A. Anyone with
σ < σA decides to have an abortion. A lower A leads to a greater threshold value of σA, and
therefore more individuals decide to have abortions to terminate their pregnancies.
1.2.2 Model Implication: Family Size Effect and Selection Effect
The roll-out of abortion access can be modeled as an exogenous reduction to A. Legalization
of abortion makes it easier to obtain, but there are still several monetary and psychic costs
associated with terminating one’s pregnancy even after abortion is legalized. The roll-out of
abortion service providers does not simply eliminate A either, and parents might still find
it desirable to give birth to the unwanted child. Nevertheless, a decrease to A effectively
10I also assume for simplicity that a household does not have fewer children than it wanted. In reality,
this is another possible deviation from fertility expectations that couples experience.
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truncates the distribution of σA across all households, leading to more abortions and fewer
households having unwanted children. One key implication is that abortion legalization
affects cohort characteristics through two distinct channels — family size and selection.
Consider a measure of quality for the average child in a cohort. Since the average child
represents the mean outcome of the entire cohort, the average child outcome is given by:
Y =
∫
σ>σA
Q(Nσ)f(σ)dσ
where f(σ) is the probability density function of σ.
As abortion becomes increasingly available, the cost of abortion drops from A1 to A2. Re-
duced cost leads to more abortions since a family’s willingness to avoid is more likely to
exceed the cost, and families have smaller N . Any child from a family that would have
found the cost of abortion prohibitively high, but now decides to have an abortion experi-
ences the family size effect:
∆Q(N)/∆N
∆N/∆A
Importantly, this effect is experienced by all children in the family, including the existing
children born before optimal family size is reached.
Meanwhile, abortion access also alters which pregnancies become births because families
have different reactions to the cost reduction depending on their respective σ. Since some
parents decide not to give birth, the average child changes due to the selection effect. As A
decreases, σA increases and more of the lower end of the σ distribution is truncated. Cohorts
born after abortion legalization comprise of fewer ‘marginal children’ due to selection into
childbirth.
Collectively, in the measure of the average child’s outcome, Y =
∫
σ>σA
Q(Nσ)f(σ)dσ, the
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change in the cost of an abortion affects two distinct channels — σA and N .11
An empirical strategy that compares cohorts born before and after abortion legalization mea-
sures the total treatment effect, consisting of both the family size and selection effects:
T =
∫
σ>σA2
Q(NA2)f(σ)dσ −
∫
σ>σA1
Q(NA1)f(σ)dσ
This total effect can be decomposed into the two channels:
T =
∫
σ>σA2
Q(NA2)f(σ)dσ −
∫
σ>σA1
Q(NA1)f(σ)dσ
=
∫
σ>σA1
Q(NA2)f(σ)dσ −
∫
σ>σA1
Q(NA1)f(σ)dσ −
σA
2∫
σA1
Q(NA2)f(σ)dσ
=
∫
σ>σA1
[Q(NA2)−Q(NA1)]f(σ)dσ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Family size effect
−
σA
2∫
σA1
Q(NA2)f(σ)dσ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection effect
1.2.3 Family Size Effect: A Valid Identification Strategy
To identify the family size effect, consider the estimate obtained by comparing children born
before abortion was legalized between legal and illegal regions. Individuals born before abor-
tion legalization still experience the family size effect since they have different possibilities
of having an unwanted younger sibling. The change in quality from Q(NA
1
) to Q(NA
2
)
persists, whereas the change in composition from σA
1
to σA
2
is zero by construction. The
11Many studies empirically document the role of selection. This channel becomes an inevitable identifica-
tion threat when estimating abortion’s family size effect on a given family. Likewise, studies that focus on
the selection channel also note the potential biases caused by changing family size. See Gruber, Levine and
Staiger (1999).
11
treatment effect can be written as:
T =
∫
σ>σA
1
Q(NA
2
)f(σ)dσ −
∫
σ>σA
1
Q(NA
1
)f(σ)dσ
=
∫
σ>σA1
[Q(NA
2
)−Q(NA1)]f(σ)dσ
To estimate this effect, it is necessary to examine the Q and N of the average child in a cohort
born before abortion was legalized in places where their parents had access, in comparison
with that of the average child in places in which abortion was illegal or difficult to obtain.
The identifying assumption that needs to be satisfied is that legalization, conditional on
covariates, must be unrelated to family background and previous child investment decisions.
Moreover, legalization can influence the children only through family size. The following
sections describe the institutional background of abortion legalization and introduce several
validity tests that support this identifying assumption.
1.3 History of Abortion Legalization and Service Roll-Out
1.3.1 Legalization and its Family Influence by State
For nearly three-quarters of the twentieth century, abortion was illegal everywhere in the
United States. In 1970, five states became the earliest to effectively legalize abortion, when
New York, Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii repealed anti-abortion laws, and California
entered an era of de-facto legalization following a late-1969 ruling that abortion ban was
unconstitutional (Potts, Diggory and Peel, 1977). In January 1973, abortion became broadly
available in all states, following the landmark decision in Roe v. Wade.
The impact of legalization was both immediate and large; the number of abortions increased
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sharply. The monetary cost of the procedure fell significantly to $80 from the previous $400
to $500 for illegal services (Kaplan, 1988) or the cost of traveling abroad (often to Europe)
while pregnant. As a result, the U.S. birth rate dropped considerably during the early 1970s
(Levine et al., 1996; Levine, 2004; Angrist and Evans, 2000). Levine et al. (1996) estimate
an 8 percent reduction in the birth rate following the actions of the early-legalizing states.
Their primary difference-in-difference results suggest a decline in relative birth rates between
early-legalizing states and the remainder of the country starting in 1970, which reversed when
all states legalized abortion beginning 1973. Notably, the birth rate decline discussed here is
contemporaneous. It remains unclear whether this dramatic change in birth rate represents
a decrease in women’s completed fertility.12
Using a longitudinal survey dataset from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I
first examine the impact of abortion legalization on women’s completed fertility. The dataset
was constructed at the child level and contains individuals’ years of birth, states of birth,
and numbers of siblings during their lifetime, obtained from linked mothers’ birth records
in the PSID Childbirth and Adoption History file.13 These variables allowed me to examine
whether abortion legalization led to smaller family sizes for the existing children.
Both demography and economics literature evinces the effectiveness of abortion on a family’s
ability to avoid unwanted childbirths. For existing older children who live in such families, it
follows that they experience decreases in the number of younger siblings. Indirect evidence
suggests that this effect is strong; most unwanted children in the United States are higher
order births, who would have been younger siblings to children in the same family (Child
Trends, 2013; Lin, Pantano and Sun, 2019).14
12One assessment of this topic can be found in Ananat, Gruber and Levine (2007), who document an
increased number of childless women. Due to limited data, they document no completed fertility effect at
the intensive margin, or influences on affected cohorts’ long-run wellbeing.
13To ensure family size information reflected the eventual number of siblings, I included only children
whose mothers most recently reported her number of children ever had after she turned 40. See Appendix
A.1 for detailed descriptions of the PSID data and sample construction.
14Unwanted children are rare among first births. Parents often consider early-born children mistimed and
unintended but nevertheless wanted. Related terminology is well-developed in demography literature. See
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Panel A of Figure 1.1 plots the covariate-adjusted difference in family size between early-
legalizing states and the remainder of United States by birth year.15 The pattern is largely
as expected, similar to what Levine et al. (1996) document for the birth rate. A reduction
in average family size is visually evident after 1967 in early-legalizing states. A gap appears
and then closes within three birth cohorts. Important to this paper’s identification strategy,
the decline first appears among cohorts born two years before (in 1968) the abortion ban
was lifted in early-legalizing states (in 1970). Cohorts born further before the repeal had
more time elapsed between birth and access to abortion, and therefore had as many younger
siblings as when abortion was illegal. The difference remains statistically indistinguishable
from zero in every year before 1968, whereas cohort born immediately before legalization
experienced the largest reduction in family size (0.232).
Family size depends on many factors, with one concern being that trends related to a
mother’s behaviors or characteristics might have changed around the same time abortion
access changed. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the difference in the number of siblings between
early-legalizing and remaining states, stratified by several maternal characteristics. These
characteristics are common predictors of unwanted pregnancies and thus relate closely to
the probability of having an abortion. Indeed, all of these predictors appear to drive the
reduction in the number of siblings more than the overall sample; the effect appears strongest
among children born to unmarried women (significant at the 10% level), women over 35, and
women with lower incomes or who were non-white.
Panels B and C of Figure 1.1 show regression coefficients by parity. Patterns among first
Santelli et al. (2003).
15The covariate-adjustment exercise was conducted using generalized difference-in-differences specification:
Yi,b,s = δs+xi,b,sβ+φt
∑A
j=a 1(b = j)+pit
∑A
j=a 1(b = j)×Repeals+i,b,s, where Yi,b,s is the total number of
younger siblings of individual i born in state s in year b. Vector xi,b,s is a set of individual- and family-level
covariates, including race, gender, and mother’s completed education and age at birth. δs is either a set of
state of birth fixed effects or an indicator of whether the state of birth was among early legalizers that repealed
the abortion ban in 1970. The coefficient of interest, pit reflects the change in the relationship between birth
cohorts and their eventual number of younger siblings when early-repeal states legalized abortion and other
states maintained the ban.
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births and higher parities appear similar. The consistency indicates the events that might
have created incentives for families to have their first child earlier either did not have a
significant impact or the effect is uncorrelated with having a smaller family. Appendix Table
A.1 shows the magnitude of the effect by parity and with estimates placed into three-cohort
bins to increase precision.
1.3.2 Discussion of Cross-State Analysis
Since the innovative use of the staggered legalization of abortion for quasi-experimental re-
search, many studies have examined the impacts on children and also discussed problems
with relying on cross-state variation extensively. Cohorts born after abortion access experi-
ence lower infant mortality (Gruber, Levine and Staiger, 1999) and decreased instances of
adolescent substance use (Charles and Stephens, 2006). Women who would have mothered
these children experience significant increases in college graduation (Ananat et al., 2009).
Yet these compelling results are debated constantly (Donohue and Levitt, 2004; Dills and
Miron, 2006; Foote and Goetz, 2008; Donohue and Levitt, 2008).
One major challenge is that cross-state comparisons of adolescent and adult outcomes are
potentially subject to influences from factors other than abortion. States that repealed
abortion bans prior to Roe v. Wade are special in that their social policies are progressive
in other ways. Laws passed around the same time by these states might correlate with
the legalization of abortion. Some of these laws are specifically related to reproductive
health. For example, legal restrictions on the birth control pill varied considerably during the
1960s (Bailey, 2010) and were decided largely by states.16 Other laws did not target family
planning but created alternative channels that might affect later-life outcomes considerably.
For example, state supreme courts ordered school finance reforms beginning in 1971 (Hoxby,
2001), overturning public K-12 school finance systems for the same cohorts affected most
16Bailey (2010) find that sales bans of the Pill does not correlate with repeal of abortion bans.
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by abortion legalization. Claims that abortion legalization lowered crime rate are disputed
by Joyce (2004) who notes the potentially confounding crack cocaine epidemic, which began
during the late 1980s and arrived in New York and California earlier than elsewhere.
Even when changes occurred at the national level, they threaten identification in situations
where they cause heterogeneous effects across states. Bailey and Chyn (2020) found a con-
siderable fertility response during the Vietnam War when American families sought ways
to avoid military service; one way to qualify for deferment was having children. The incen-
tive appears significantly larger in the five states that legalized abortion earlier, since their
anti-war sentiment was much higher than elsewhere in the United States. This differential
response creates confounding factors for abortion estimates that resulted from cross-state
comparisons, since children born to families that had compelling reasons to avoid serving
in the military might have grown up in very different childhood circumstances than others
did.
To circumvent these concerns about cross-state analysis, this paper exploits the staggered
availability of abortion clinics at the county level.17
1.3.3 County-level Roll-Out of Abortion Services
Although abortion was legalized by states and then nationwide later, its availability varied
considerably across the country. As many critiques of state-level comparisons point out, an
17As a proof of concept, I also implement a similar design as that used in previous cross-state comparisons.
Appendix Table A.2 presents state-level estimates on children’s completed education using PSID. The results
suggest that those born immediately before the 1970 policy change in early-repeal states tended to complete
more years of education in comparison to older cohorts, and in comparison to individuals born in non-
repeal states. In the preferred specification with year and state of birth fixed effects (column 2), consistent
with the hypothesis that having unwanted younger siblings causes disruptions in parental investment and
compromises family environments, the same cohorts of individuals who experienced a decrease in young
siblings also experienced a 0.321-year increase in completed education. The effects appear driven by higher
education, with college completion having had the largest effect (15.5 percentage points, column 8). If
there were state-level changes, state-specific trends, or national events that imposed differential effects that
correlated positively with both repeal of the abortion ban and education, then these estimates represent the
upper bounds of abortion’s human capital effects through family size.
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ideal research design would be to exploit some form of within-state variation of abortion
access (Foote and Goetz, 2008).
Using county-level information on service providers made available by the Guttmacher In-
stitute,18 Figure 1.2 shows the roll-out of abortion service providers in each continental U.S.
county.19 The map shows idiosyncratic variation in access timing; some counties were able to
establish service access immediately, likely converting existing clinics to part-time providers.
Others did not have service providers until much later. The staggered introduction is widely
observed within each state.
Demonstrating the validity of a roll-out design is critical to this paper’s analysis. A formal
test would need to show that the year abortion services began in a county is unrelated
to various county-level characteristics, and to potential underlying trends in fertility that
are county-specific. One hypothesis is that abortion clinics first appeared in areas that
are more progressive, highly-educated, and affluent. Economic circumstances are commonly
associated with fertility declines (Foster, Rosenzweig et al., 2007), and areas might have
varying demand for abortion based on education and income level. This would have likely
caused some areas to gain access to abortion earlier and be more developed in human capital
at the same time. Policymakers and service providers, and their funding sources, might also
have targeted some areas. For example, resources might be directed first to areas with the
highest incidence of unwanted births or observe an increasing trend. All of these channels
create potential violations of the exclusion restriction, which requires abortion service roll-out
to be uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of child development.
I examine such potential correlations in Table 1.1. I regress a set of county characteristics,
collected from the 1970 County and City Data book, on the timing of first abortion service
providers in counties that obtained access between 1970 and 1979. Among 16 characteristics,
18This information was cleaned and used by Bailey (2012)
19Information on the number of service providers in New York, California, and Washington between 1970
and 1972 is missing and was therefore extrapolated from 1973.
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the only predictors of getting a service provider early during the 1970s are total population
and share of urban population. It appears, as one might expect, that the service arrived
first in the most populous places and thus those most in need. The demographic pattern
motivates use of urban-population-by-cohort time trends, which I control for in all empirical
models.20
Notably, roll-out of abortion service providers does not appear to correlate with income,
education, leading political party, or the age structure of a county’s population. Service
seems to have begun in both affluent and less-developed counties following the legalization,
despite concerns about endogeneity arising from abortion’s varying popularity. A more
detailed comparison of different groups of counties appears in the Appendix.
Another threat to identification is that timing of abortion clinic’s roll-out might be correlated
with counties’ fertility rates, which causes omitted variable bias because fertility rate is
associated with an area’s many unobserved characteristics that also determine children’s
development. Figure 1.3 examines this correlation directly. Using data from the NCHS
Natality Detail Files, panel A plots county-level general fertility rates on the timing of
abortion clinic’s roll-out. It excludes counties from early-legalizing states and focuses on the
period between 1973 and 1979. Roll-out timing does not appear to be correlated with the
level of fertility rates immediately before Roe v. Wade.
Exploiting the staggered timing also requires careful examination of pre-trends. If clinics were
funded to specifically target areas in which fertility rates remained high despite the national
trend, were trending up, or were decreasing at a slower rate than the national average,
then this identification strategy might falsely attribute these trends to abortion availability.
Panel B, Figure 1.3 plots changes in fertility rates between 1968 and 1972 and the timing of
abortion clinic’s roll-out. A proactively targeted roll-out scheme would predict a negatively
20Share of urban population, u, was used to generate five categorical variables, indicating u = 0, 0 < u ≤
25, 25 < u ≤ 50, 50 < u ≤ 75, 75 < u ≤ 100, and interacted with cohort trends.
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slopped line fitted through the figure, but the actual pattern suggests no evidence of selective
roll-out at the county level. Despite various hypotheses regarding how service might appear,
actual roll-out of abortion service providers appears largely idiosyncratic.
1.4 Census, Administrative Data, and Research Design
1.4.1 The Data
An ideal dataset for analyzing the long-run impact of childhood family size requires infor-
mation on 1) place of birth or place of residence in early childhood, 2) human capital and
economic outcomes well into adulthood, and 3) a sample large enough to detect potentially
small effects and that contains enough counties. This paper relies on large-scale, restricted-
access data to achieve identification.
I use the newly available long-form 2000 Decennial Census and the 2001-2016 American
Community Surveys (ACS) linked to the Social Security Administration’s Numident file
through a protected identification key (PIK). The Census/ACS data include nearly one-
quarter of the U.S. population and observe an extensive set of adult outcomes on educational
attainment, labor-market participation, family income and poverty status, as well as living
circumstances and neighborhood quality.
To focus around the roll-out of abortion services, my sample is comprised of individuals born
between 1960 and 1986 and individuals between age 25 and 54 in their prime-earning years.
The sample excludes individuals with allocated or missing values and counties with unknown
numbers of abortion clinics. To minimize disclosure burden from the Federal Statistical
Research Data Center, I constructed a full-information sample to further exclude individuals
who are missing any of the outcome variables, except for outcomes that are logged. The
result is a final analysis sample of about fifteen million American adults.
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Linkage to the Numident file provides information on individuals’ exact places of birth,
which are matched to counties of birth (Stuart, Taylor and Bailey, 2016). The dataset is
then merged with county-level abortion service provider information to measure precisely the
relative time between an individual’s year of birth and the year of local service access. One
shortcoming is lack of family background information in the data, which might help identify
mechanisms or create a high-impact sample. Nevertheless, findings using PSID suggested a
strong family size channel that can be plausibly isolated, and the sample size is sufficiently
large to detect important effects that might be small in magnitude.
To minimize computational resources, I collapsed the data into cells by birth year, sur-
vey year, and county of birth. When used during analyses, the cells were weighted using
the number of observations in each cell (Solon, Haider and Wooldridge, 2015). I also con-
structed indices by normalizing and grouping long-run outcomes into three categories —
human capital, economic self-sufficiency, and living quality — which helped increase statis-
tical power and mitigated issues related to multiple hypothesis testing (Kling, Liebman and
Katz, 2007).
1.4.2 Research Design to Capture Abortion’s Impact
My research design exploits the natural experiment of abortion service providers’ roll-out
from 1970 to 1979, with a flexible event-study framework,
Ybct = θc + αt + δs(c)b +Z
′
cbβ +
∑
y
piy1{b− Tc = y}Abortionc + bct (1.2)
where Ybct is a measure of adult human capital, self-sufficiency, or living quality at time of
survey t for individual born in county c in year b. θc is a set of county fixed effects, αt is a set
of survey year fixed effects, and δs(c)b is a set of state-by-cohort fixed effects. Importantly,
controlling for state-by-cohort effects alleviates concerns raised by critics regarding changes to
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state policies and varying prior trends that affected birth cohort differentially. Also notably,
this level of flexibility accounts for changes in travel distance to one of the early-legalizing
states, a factor highlighted by Joyce, Tan and Zhang (2013) and that is also captured by
state-by-cohort effects.
To control for several time-varying characteristics at the county level, I include Z′cbβ, a set
of county-level observables and demographic controls measured in an individual’s county and
year of birth (see also Hoynes, Page and Stevens 2011; Bailey 2012; Bailey and Goodman-
Bacon 2015). These observables are interacted with a linear trend in year of birth, except
for a set of categorical indicators for county population, which is interacted with year of
birth dummies to allow more flexible control of the changing population density. Abortionc
is an indicator for ever having at least one abortion service provider between 1970 and 1979.
All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for an arbitrary within-
county covariance structure (Arellano, 1987; Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).
Tc denotes the year abortion first became available in county c. Event-time y represents an
individual’s birth year relative to the local roll-out of abortion services. The point estimates
of interest are piy, which capture the evolution, by event-time, of the educational or economic
outcomes in counties with access net of changes in untreated counties. The omitted category
is set to −8. For example, if the first abortion clinic increased human capital significantly for
the cohort born two years before access (i.e., t = −2) in comparison to those born eight years
before access, the point estimate for pi−2 should be positive and statistically significant.
The expected results are that for the cohort born immediately before access became available
(t = −1), the effect on educational and economic outcomes through decreasing numbers
of younger sibling should be strongest. Individuals born after abortion became available
(t >= 0) experienced a combination of the family size and selection effects. Abortion should
have little effect on cohorts born earlier (t <= −8). Effects from pi−8 to pi−1 should increase
gradually. Based on the estimated first-stage effect on family size, a test of joint significance
21
for pi−3,−2,−1 should be positive and statistically distinguishable from zero.
1.5 How Abortion Impacts Family Size and Long-Run Wellbe-
ing
1.5.1 Abortion Access and Family Size by County
I first examine the effect of abortion providers’ roll-out on family size. Information on
individuals’ date and county of birth is obtained from the restricted-use geo-coded PSID,
which I linked to abortion service providers data. I also linked the main PSID interviews with
the PSID Childbirth and Adoption History file to obtain information on siblings. Appendix
A.2 describes the PSID data and sample construction.
I tested the primary empirical specification with several modifications. First, the dependent
variable is the completed number of siblings for individual i born in county c in year b. To
ensure the sibling count describes an individual’s completed family size, I collected informa-
tion only when the most recent observation of the mother was after she turned 40. Second,
to improve the precision of the estimates, I controlled for a set of individual-level covari-
ates, including gender, race, maternal education, and birth order in family. I also grouped
event-time dummies into three-year bins.
Figure 1.4 presents the event-study estimates of this first-stage effect. Compared to a control
group of children born approximately eight years before an abortion service provider first
appeared in their county, children born closer to abortion becoming available experienced
significant reductions in their completed number of siblings, averaging 0.277 fewer siblings
(statistically significant at the 10-percent level) for children born the year before the service
launched. In contrast, the change in completed family size remained indistinguishable from
zero for individuals born eight years or more before abortion became available, since the
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roll-out did not arrive soon enough to affect younger siblings born after them.
An alternative identification strategy to the event-study specification above is to exploit
cross-county variation in the intensity of providers. I replaced the set of event-time dummies,∑
y piy1{b− Tc = y}Abortionc in equation (2), with a continuous measure of the number of
abortion service providers per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44. This intensity measure is denoted
1(b = j)Prov73−78c , which describes the average number of abortion service providers in
a county within 5 years of Roe v. Wade (1973 to 1978) per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44
interacted with indicators of birth cohorts. Since information on abortion service providers
is missing from 1970 to 1972, this exercise also excluded the five early-legalizing states from
the sample.
Table 1.2 presents estimates from this service intensity analysis. For cohorts born just
before 1973 in counties with more access to abortion immediately after Roe v. Wade, their
completed family size experienced a significant decrease. The specification that includes
state-specific trends and county characteristics interacted with linear time trends (Column
2) accounts for differential trends that might confound cross-sectional analysis. The 1970-
1972 birth cohorts experienced a decrease in the number of younger siblings by 3.18 per
increase in abortion service providers per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44, in comparison to the
omitted category of 1960-1963 cohorts. Consistent with the event-study estimates in Figure
1.2, children born more than three years before Roe v. Wade do not display any negative
relationships between family size and access to abortion. The magnitude of the estimate
for 1970 to 1972 cohorts, when multiplied by the sample’s average abortion service provider
intensity of 0.07, implies an estimated decrease of 0.223 siblings. These results provide
further evidence that within-state variation in the availability of abortion is a determinant
of children’s family size.
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1.5.2 Long-Run Effects on Human Capital, Self-Sufficiency, and Living Qual-
ity
I next implement the event-study specification to examine the effect of fewer younger siblings
on adult outcomes of these children using three indices — human capital, economic self-
sufficiency, and neighborhood quality.
Figure 1.5 plots estimates for the overall sample in event-time. Among compositionally
balanced birth cohorts (i.e., individuals born between fourteen years before and five years
after the roll-out of the first abortion clinic), the patterns appear as expected. For each
index, access to abortion service had no measurable effect on children born eight years or
more before. For these children, it is likely that their parents gave birth to them and their
younger siblings while abortion was still illegal or difficult to obtain. However, estimates
for all three indices exhibit an increase between event time −8 and −1, when children
were born closer to the year abortion service became available. The magnitudes of the
effects appear particularly large when approaching event-time −1 (i.e., born just before
abortion roll-out), and the joint test of pi−3,−2,−1 rejects the hypothesis of no effect on the
human capital and neighborhood quality indices. To the right of event-time −1, the patterns
become less consistent across outcomes. Indeed, in the case of economic self-sufficiency and
neighborhood quality, estimates become larger than those at −1, potentially due to selection
into childbirth.
Event-study estimates plotted in Figure 1.5 are intent-to-treat (ITT) effects. Table 1.3
presents the average treatment-effects-on-the-treated (ATET) by scaling event-time magni-
tudes using this paper’s estimated effect on completed family size, a reduction of 0.277. To
investigate which characteristics drive the increase in the indices, Table 1.3 also summarizes
the estimates for the main components that comprise three indices. Column 1 presents the
mean of the outcome for the control group; individuals born 8 years before abortion roll-out.
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Column 2 summarizes ITT estimates and standard errors for each outcome of children born
just before abortion roll-out (event-time −1). Column 5 presents ATET (coefficients in Col-
umn 2 divided by 0.277). Column 6 presents the percentage change implied by the ATET
relative to the control group (the ratio of Column 5 to Column 1). I also include results from
formal joint tests of zero effect on children born just before roll-out (i.e., event-time −3 to
−1, Column 3), and on children too early to be affected by abortion access (i.e., event-time
smaller than −8, Column 4). The total number of observations (15, 891, 000) highlights the
large sample size due to the restricted Census/ACS and administrative Numident data.
Overall, a decrease in family size by one caused the standardized human capital index to
increase by 4.2 percent of a standard deviation, reflecting a 0.146-year increase in completed
education. A major advantage of the large-scale data, besides improved precision, is the
ability to investigate a rich set of outcomes that cover many dimensions well into children’s
adulthood. Estimates for the individual components of the human capital index suggest a
moderate 1-percent increase in high school completion and a much larger increase in college
completion of 8 percent (2.7 percentage points). College education is the costliest child
investment in the United States, and the large estimate accords with the hypothesis that
family size mostly affects whether parents can afford to send their children to college. The
estimate also appears large for having a professional or doctoral degree, another expensive
investment that might depend heavily on families’ credit constraints. Individuals born 8
years or more before abortion became available experienced no effect since their family sizes
were unlikely to have decreased. With the exception of professional or doctoral degree,
tests of joint significance for piy,y<−8 fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect in all
outcomes.
Since family environments might affect boys and girls differently, Table 1.4 presents estimates
by gender. Gains in human capital appear driven by men, who experienced a 0.242-year gain
in schooling, a 1.6-percent (1.5 percentage points) increase in high school completion, and
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a 13.4-percent (4.4 percentage points) increase in college completion. Having small families
also significantly increased men’s likelihood to obtain a professional or doctoral degree (1
percentage point) and work in a professional occupation (3.1 percentage points). Overall,
for men who had one fewer sibling, the human capital index increased by 6.8 percent of a
standard deviation (statistically significant at the 1-percent level).
Gains in male human capital also persisted as gains in economic self-sufficiency. On average,
men experienced a 1.4-percent increase in labor supply (Table 1.4, column 6) on the extensive
margin and a 1.5-percent increase in weeks of work. They also experienced a 4.5-percent
gain in wage income, making them 17.6-percent less likely to live in poverty. In contrast, the
effect of family size on girls’ long-run self-sufficiency is imprecise despite gains experienced in
years of schooling (0.05 year) and professional or doctoral degree completion (32.3 percent,
0.9 percentage points). Women’s labor-force participation after growing up in small families
appears to have decreased. This reduction might be surprising, but is consistent with an
income effect resulted from marrying higher-earning men. This channel remains to be tested
since one important dimension missing from this exercise is direct observation of family
structure and marriage quality.
Nevertheless, estimates for a group of census tract characteristics provide additional evidence
of how men and women experienced changes to their adult living standards. Panel C, Table
1.3 and Table 1.5 presents results on neighborhood quality measures. For females and males,
children born just before abortion access experienced significant improvements in measures
of quality of their census tract of residence in adulthood. On average, their neighborhoods
have nearly 2-percent more home ownership (significant for women and marginally significant
overall).21 Smaller family also caused a 4.5-percent increase in adult neighborhood income
and a 6.9-percent decrease in share of children in poverty in one’s neighborhood. The sum-
mary index of neighborhood quality experienced an increase of 4.8 standard deviation when
21Corrections for multiple hypothesis testing is needed to interpret the p-values for individual outcomes.
An exercise to account for multiple hypothesis testing appears in the Appendix.
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decreasing family size by one.
1.5.3 Testing for Confounding Changes
The main empirical strategy implemented in this paper is valid only if the roll-out of abortion
service providers is uncorrelated with other factors that might affect children’s long-run
outcomes besides family size. In addition to validity checks in Section 1.3, this section
investigates a variety of family background variables to test for changes in determinants
of childhood environment that could arise in the treatment group in comparison to the
control group. Specifically, my research design, which focuses on the cohorts born before
abortion service providers became available, aims to circumvent the issue of selection causing
compositional changes of children. Ruling out changes in average family-level observables
provides compelling evidence that results are not driven by selection into childbirth.
To examine these confounding factors, Figure 1.6 applies the specification in equation (2), but
replaces the dependent variable with a series of family-level observables. To examine whether
sample selection happens to a certain parity, it also stratifies by first and higher-order births.
The results show no detectable effects on maternal education, mother’s marital status or age
at birth, mother’s age at birth, or probability of low birth weight.22 The effects on number
of siblings is significant despite the non-results for these observable characteristics, which
supports my hypothesis that for the cohorts born immediately before abortion legalization,
the policy change affect their human capital only through an improvement in childhood
family environment facilitated by a better planned family.
The concern this research design aims to address is that identification using cohorts born
after abortion legalization will be confounded by changing composition of the sample. Figure
1.6 panel B shows this concern appears to be real. For the cohorts born after abortion
22Parents may establish fertility stopping rules. For instance, they might decide against having more
children if a child has low birth weight.
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became available, their parents appear to be more educated, older, and more likely to be
married. It is also suggestive that they are less likely to have low birth weight. Therefore,
even if significant improvements in life cycle outcomes can be observed for these cohorts,
there seems to be little reason to attribute these impact solely to improved childhood family
environment.
1.6 Interactive Effects: Complementarity or Substitutability?
A long-standing hypothesis about human capital intervention programs is that investing in
early childhood generates substantial long-term returns by increasing the returns to subse-
quent investments. Disadvantages in early childhood grow over time (Currie and Thomas,
2000), and interventions at this stage are effective in breaking the cycle of poverty because
they increase the returns to interventions at later stages; a feature formalized by Cunha
and Heckman (2007) as dynamic complementarity. Although it is impossible to pin down
the exact stage when family size intervenes during the dynamic process of child develop-
ment, evidence of complementarity or substitutability with other human capital programs
provides useful insights for evaluating such programs as well as understanding the mech-
anisms of family size effect. This section examines interactive effects with several public
programs introduced in the 1960s. These programs aimed to provide social safety net for
disadvantaged children and tackled the causes poverty from several aspects. Exposure to
these programs varied considerably in late 1960s and early 1970s across counties (Bailey and
Duquette, 2014).
I use the Census/ACS data and implement an extension of the county-level event-study
specification. In addition to the main effects of event-time dummies, I include terms that
capture the interaction between each event-time dummy and an indicator of high exposure
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to each public program (Head Start, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and CAP23),
∑
y φy1{b−Tc =
y}Abortionc ×HiExpbc, to test hypotheses of effect interactions.
The first hypothesis is that reduction in family size facilitates more parental time which
complement other programs. Children from smaller families receive more help after school,
more attention when having health conditions, and in general are better prepared to benefit
of human capital interventions during their childhood. Table 1.6 suggests that smaller fam-
ily size complements both Head Start and Food Stamp Programs. The effects of preschool
provided by Head Start on human capital and neighborhood quality are significantly larger
in places where children experienced reduced family sizes. The Food Stamp Program has
a significantly positive interaction with smaller family size on economic self-sufficiency out-
comes. It appears that children in smaller families benefit more from the support of Food
Stamps. These findings suggest evidence of complementarities between reduction in family
sizes and two of America’s largest safety net programs.
Another hypothesis it that reduction in family size and some programs are substitutes. One
would expect a negative interaction if the decrease in family size help families avoid ex-
periencing hardship that are targeted by some programs. For example, Gillezeau (2010)
documents that the Community Action Program (CAP) decreased the number of riots in
1960s and 1970s. These programs might not have significant impacts if families are already
living in peaceful neighborhoods. Consistent with this hypothesis, the CAP’s effect on neigh-
borhood quality, which includes average family income and property value in individual’s
census tract, is significantly smaller for children from smaller families. There also appears
to be a negative albeit statistically insignificant interaction between the effects of CAP and
smaller families on human capital and self-sufficiency.
Additionally, Appendix Table A.4 uses the PSID data and shows the evidence also exists on
23Information about Head Start grants is collected from the National Archives Community Action Program
electronic files and made available through the work of Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015) and Bailey, Sun
and Timpe (2018).
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the state level.24 Among individuals born between 1960 and 1980, Head Start has a positive
and significant effect on completed years of education. Moreover, having an abortion-induced
reduction in family size, indicated by born before 1970 in an early-repeal state, increases Head
Start’s human capital benefit by 1.02 years of education. The effect of the interaction term is
largely driven by college attendance, suggesting that the monetary cost of attending college
could be a key factor when families with Head Start access decide their children’s education
based on family size. On the other hand, college completion rate responds only to the family
size treatment (and is marginally significant for the Head Start treatment), but not to the
interaction between the two treatments.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Since Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973) formalized the relationship
between child quantity and quality in theory, many researchers have attempted to identify
the family size effect in practice, and their findings have been mixed. Especially with modern
identification strategies and more comprehensive data from developed countries, estimates
have been remarkably imprecise and inconsistent with the theoretical predictions. The en-
dogenous nature of choosing one’s family size creates potential threats to identification, and
most instrumental variables used previously might affect unobserved factors in the compli-
cated process of raising children. Many researchers attribute the lack of evidence to these
empirical caveats.
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of family size. The source of variation
I exploit is the staggered county-level roll-out of access to abortion service providers. For
24In addition to the terms specified earlier, this model includes an interaction between accesses to abortion
immediately after birth, and access to Head Start in county of birth when the individual is age eligible (age 5
or younger), 1(b = j)×Repeals ×HeadStartbc. Additionally, xbct includes interactions between Head Start
access and cohorts, and the Head Start indicator. The result is a fully interacted model between cohorts,
an indicator of early-repeal state, and an indicator of being age-eligible when Head Start first begun in the
individual’s county of birth.
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the first time, I document that significant reductions in completed family size occurred for
children born just before abortion became available; their parents became more capable of
avoiding unplanned children and thus had smaller families in comparison to those who still
could not obtain abortion services easily. To examine long-run outcomes, I use confidential
Census/ACS data linked to the county and date of birth information in the large-scale
administrative Numident file. I find that reductions in family size generated substantial long-
run improvements in human capital, economic self-sufficiency, and neighborhood quality.
Decreasing family size by one led to an 8-percent (2.7 percentage points) increase in college
completion, a 1.4-percent (1.3 percentage points) increase in men’s labor supply, and a 4.5
log-point increase in adult wages. For both men and women, smaller families led to better
living quality in adulthood, represented by significant increases in average home ownership
and average family income of the neighborhood in which they live.
My estimates came from cohorts born just before abortion roll-out instead of those born after.
Literature on abortion legalization documents that abortion leads to selection. Children born
after abortion access were selected into birth and came from different family backgrounds on
average. Focusing on pre-abortion cohorts circumvents this problem and isolates the causal
effects of decreased family size. I find no change in measures of family background among
pre-abortion children; abortion access affected them only through family size. To this front,
my findings also contribute to literature that evaluates consequences of abortion legalization,
which commonly highlights a selection effect on the marginal child. My findings suggest that
access to abortion also had substantial impacts on the ‘inframarginal’ children; the children
already born.
It is worth noting that the existing quantity-quality literature provides an extensive discus-
sion on why evidence on the family size effect remains inconclusive. Apart from the concern
regarding the validity of existing instruments, families with more children might genuinely
benefit from economies of scale or have a positive interaction between child quantity and
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quality in their preferences. Further, any particular instrumental variable can identify only
effects on a group of individuals affected by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; An-
grist, Lavy and Schlosser, 2010). Effects might vary considerably on different margins, and
in some cases might even change sign. This paper not only introduces a plausibly exogenous
variation in family size that induces substantial effects, but focuses on the margin that aligns
with the target of many reproductive health policies. I argue that a smaller family matters,
particularly when it is achieved by avoiding having unplanned children in excess of a family’s
desired fertility.
In regards to implication for human capital and anti-poverty programs, this paper also
demonstrates interactions between family size and social safety net programs aimed to sup-
port disadvantaged children. My findings imply significant policy complementarities; having
small families increases long-run human capital returns to Head Start and the economic
impacts of Food Stamps. Overall, these results elucidate how reproductive health policies
can, by reducing family size, facilitate children’s human capital formation, increase their
economic opportunities, and help families escape poverty.
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Figure 1.1. Difference in Number of Siblings, Early-Legalizing vs. Other States
A. All
B. First Births
C. Non-First Births
Notes: Point estimates of cohort indicators interacted with the early-legalizing indicator are plotted.
Sample includes individuals from PSID Childbirth and Adoption History File whose mother’s most recent
observation is after she turns 40 years old. Covariates include gender, race, mother’s age at birth, and
categories of maternal education. Regression controls for year of birth and state of birth fixed effects.
Confidence intervals presented are on the 90% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at
the state level. 33
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Figure 1.3. County Fertility Rates and Service Roll-Out
A. Year of Roll-Out and General Fertility Rate (GFR)
B. Year of Roll-Out and 1968 to 1972 Change in the GFR
Notes: The line indicates the estimated relationship between the GFR or the change in GFR and the year
of first abortion service provider in the county. The slope estimate for panel A is -0.93 (standard error
0.67). The slope estimate for panel B is 0.04 (standard error 0.27). Source: NCHS Natality Detail Files,
1968 and 1972.
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Figure 1.4. Abortion Roll-Out and Family Size, Event-Study Estimates
Notes: Dependent variable is completed family size. Point estimates of event-time grouped into three-year
bins are plotted. Sample includes individuals from PSID Childbirth and Adoption History File whose
mother’s most recent observation is after she turns 40 years old. Regression controls for state-by-cohort
fixed effects and county fixed effects. 90-percent, point-wise confidence intervals for each estimate are
presented. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. Source: Restricted
PSID Individual and Childhood and Adoption History File.
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Figure 1.5. Effects of Abortion Roll-Out on Long-Run Indices
A. Human Capital Index
B. Economic Self-Sufficiency Index
C. Neighborhood Quality Index
Notes: Each figure plots event-study estimates for long-run outcomes using the specification in equation
(2). Standard errors clustered at the county level. 90-percent, point-wise confidence intervals for each
estimate are presented. Source: Restricted Census/ACS and SSA Numident file.
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Figure 1.6. Test of Potential Threats to Identification
Notes: Sample includes individuals from PSID Childbirth and Adoption History File whose mother’s most
recent observation is after she turns 40 years old. Each point plotted is the event-time estimate of the −1
to −3 bin. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the state level. Vertical dashed lines are
drawn at ±1.645. Source: Restricted PSID Individual and Childhood and Adoption History File.
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Table 1.2. Number of Younger Siblings and Service Intensity since Roe v. Wade
# Younger Siblings Any Younger Siblings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Born 1964-66 -0.106 -0.136 -0.125** -0.139**
[0.231] [0.228] [0.054] [0.053]
Born 1967-69 0.450 0.375 0.035 0.009
[0.328] [0.317] [0.100] [0.098]
Born 1970-72 0.795** 0.755* 0.073 0.050
[0.387] [0.376] [0.130] [0.129]
Born 1964-66 x # Prov/1k 0.541 0.712 0.689 0.745
[2.521] [2.463] [0.742] [0.730]
Born 1967-69 x # Prov/1k -1.606 -1.538 -0.428 -0.439
[1.904] [2.059] [0.636] [0.655]
Born 1970-72 x # Prov/1k -3.312** -3.175** -0.430 -0.368
[1.590] [1.523] [0.870] [0.873]
State FE x Trends X X X X
County Covariates x Trends X X
Observations 1,713 1,713 1,713 1,713
Mean Y 1.300 1.300 0.680 0.680
Mean # Service Prov 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700
Notes: Sample includes individuals from PSID Childbirth and Adoption History File born between 1960
and 1972 whose mother’s most recent observation is after she turns 40 years old. Covariates include gender,
race, mother’s age at birth, and categories of maternal education. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered at the state level.
40
Table 1.3. Summary of Event-Study Estimates on Long-Run Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control
Mean
Event
Study at -1
F −3 to
−1 joint
F left of
−8 joint
ATET ATET %
Dependent Variables (N=15,891,000) (s.e.)
A. Human capital index 0.0117 2.835 1.191 0.0422
(0.00522)
Years of schooling 13.790 0.0404 3.476 1.317 0.1458 1.1%
(0.01810)
High school or GED completed 0.932 0.0027 2.087 1.139 0.0097 1.0%
(0.00151)
Completed 4 year college 0.332 0.0073 2.642 0.935 0.0265 8.0%
(0.00336)
Professional or doctoral degree 0.031 0.0025 3.416 1.812 0.0090 29.1%
(0.00081)
Has a professional job 0.370 0.0033 0.809 0.883 0.0119 3.2%
(0.00274)
B. Economic self-sufficiency index 0.0040 1.598 1.401 0.0144
(0.00329)
Worked last year 0.857 -0.0001 1.157 0.468 -0.0003 0.0%
(0.00174)
Number of weeks worked last year 40.990 -0.0192 1.925 0.794 -0.0693 -0.2%
(0.09520)
Usual hours works per week 35.590 0.1200 0.919 1.134 0.4332 1.2%
(0.09290)
Positive labor income (wage only) 0.810 0.0008 1.331 0.338 0.0027 0.3%
(0.00193)
Log labor income (wage only) 10.610 0.0084 1.089 1.035 0.0303
(0.00471)
In poverty 0.100 0.0006 0.851 1.389 0.0021 2.1%
(0.00200)
C. Neighborhood quality index 0.0132 2.153 0.504 0.0477
(0.00562)
Mean home ownership in tract 0.730 0.0034 1.401 1.334 0.0123 1.7%
(0.00181)
Positive small family income in tract 0.941 0.0013 3.594 1.511 0.0045 0.5%
(0.00039)
Log family income to poverty ratio in tract 5.939 0.013 2.679 0.664 0.0451
(0.00442)
Share single head of family in tract 0.434 -0.001 0.361 1.153 -0.0026 -0.6%
(0.00093)
Share children in poverty in tract 0.201 -0.004 2.863 1.031 -0.0138 -6.9%
(0.00146)
Notes: In Column 1, the control mean is calculated using the individuals born 8 years before abortion
access. Column 2 presents the estimated intent-to-treat (ITT) effect evaluated at event-time −1 using the
specification in equation (2) (see Figure 1.5). Column 3 and Column 4 present test statistics for
joint-significance of event-time −3 to −1 and of event-time smaller than −8, respectively. The average
treatment-effect-on-the-treated (ATET) estimate in Column 5 divides the ITT effect by the estimated
reduction in completed family size, 0.277. Column 6 computes the percentage change implied by the ATET
relative to the control mean (the ratio of Column 5 to Column 1). Percent change is inapplicable and
therefore left blank for standardized indices and for logged outcomes. Source: Restricted Census/ACS and
SSA Numident file.
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Table 1.4. Event-Study Estimates on Human Capital and Self-Sufficiency, by Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variables Control
Mean
Event Study
at -1 (s.e.)
F -3 to
-1 joint
F left of
-8 joint
ATET ATET %
A. Male (N=7,601,000)
i. Human capital index 0.0189 3.033 0.692 0.0682
(0.00648)
Years of schooling 13.730 0.0671 3.495 0.977 0.2422 1.8%
(0.02270)
High school or GED completed 0.923 0.0041 1.717 0.389 0.0147 1.6%
(0.00202)
Completed 4 year college 0.328 0.0122 3.104 0.676 0.0440 13.4%
(0.00411)
Professional or doctoral degree 0.036 0.0028 2.513 1.025 0.0100 27.7%
(0.00119)
Has a professional job 0.357 0.0086 2.426 0.345 0.0310 8.7%
(0.00351)
ii. Economic self-sufficiency index 0.0110 3.817 1.065 0.0397
(0.00385)
Worked last year 0.920 0.0035 1.687 0.970 0.0127 1.4%
(0.00169)
Number of weeks worked last year 45.110 0.1870 2.845 1.111 0.6751 1.5%
(0.09800)
Usual hours works per week 41.460 0.3100 3.776 0.709 1.1191 2.7%
(0.10300)
Positive labor income (wage only) 0.865 0.0046 2.047 1.490 0.0165 1.9%
(0.00200)
Log labor income (wage only) 10.880 0.0124 2.167 2.384 0.0448
(0.00552)
In poverty 0.074 -0.0036 1.994 1.424 -0.0130 -17.6%
(0.00191)
B. Female (N=8,290,000)
i. Human capital index 0.004 1.175 0.989 0.0149
(0.00551)
Years of schooling 13.850 0.014 1.960 1.059 0.0513 0.4%
(0.01880)
High school or GED completed 0.940 0.001 1.154 1.155 0.0052 0.6%
(0.00165)
Completed 4 year college 0.337 0.003 1.328 0.836 0.0094 2.8%
(0.00372)
Professional or doctoral degree 0.026 0.002 2.293 1.950 0.0085 32.3%
(0.00097)
Has a professional job 0.384 -0.002 0.168 0.728 -0.0083 -2.2%
(0.00336)
ii. Economic self-sufficiency index -0.001 1.538 1.178 -0.0034
(0.00390)
Worked last year 0.797 -0.003 1.589 1.016 -0.0117 -1.5%
(0.00247)
Number of weeks worked last year 37.160 -0.197 2.126 0.760 -0.7112 -1.9%
(0.13200)
Usual hours works per week 30.130 -0.048 0.358 1.432 -0.1736 -0.6%
(0.11200)
Positive labor income (wage only) 0.759 -0.003 1.599 0.886 -0.0098 -1.3%
(0.00266)
Log labor income (wage only) 10.320 0.001 0.139 0.735 0.0035
(0.00623)
In poverty 0.123 0.004 1.845 1.283 0.0145 11.8%
(0.00258)
Notes: See Table 3 notes.
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Table 1.5. Event-Study Estimates on Neighborhood Quality, by Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variables Control
Mean
Event
Study at -1
F -3 to
-1 joint
F left of
-8 joint
ATET ATET %
(s.e.)
A. Male (N=7,601,000)
Neighborhood quality index 0.0168 2.708 1.075 0.0606
(0.00599)
Mean home ownership in tract 0.745 0.0026 1.115 2.339 0.0094 1.3%
(0.00196)
Positive small family income in tract 0.943 0.0015 4.276 1.155 0.0054 0.6%
(0.00045)
Log family income to poverty ratio in tract 5.941 0.0145 3.399 1.782 0.0523
(0.00471)
Share single head of family in tract 0.434 -0.0012 1.178 2.197 -0.0043 -1.0%
(0.00105)
Share children in poverty in tract 0.200 -0.0044 2.830 0.928 -0.0160 -8.0%
(0.00158)
B. Female (N=8,290,000)
Neighborhood quality index 0.010 1.509 0.664 0.0347
(0.00605)
Mean home ownership in tract 0.749 0.004 2.798 0.865 0.0147 2.0%
(0.00201)
Positive small family income in tract 0.942 0.001 2.624 1.226 0.0038 0.4%
(0.00039)
Log family income to poverty ratio in tract 5.938 0.010 2.032 0.663 0.0372
(0.00467)
Share single head of family in tract 0.433 0.000 1.830 0.650 -0.0006 -0.2%
(0.00107)
Share children in poverty in tract 0.202 -0.003 2.103 0.665 -0.0116 -5.7%
(0.00152)
Notes: See Table 3 notes.
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Table 1.6. Effects Heterogeneity Interaction between Family Size and Public Programs
Abortion Access Interacted
with:
Head Start Food
Stamps
Medicaid
Expenditure
Community
Action
Programs
Outcomes:
Human Capital Index 0.0157 0.00551 0.00805 -0.00617
(s.e.) (0.00612) (0.00486) (0.00857) (0.00456)
Economic Self-Sufficiency Index 0.00467 0.00579 -0.00301 -0.00327
(s.e.) (0.00401) (0.00316) (0.00548) (0.00337)
Neighborhood Quality Index 0.0098 0.00137 0.00997 -0.00838
(s.e.) (0.00394) (0.00409) (0.00822) (0.00356)
Notes: The empirical model is similar to equation (2) but additionally includes each event-time dummy
interacted with an indicator of high exposure to a public program,
∑
y ψyDc1{b− Tc = y}Abortionc.
Estimates of the interaction effect ψy are presented. Estimates are intent-to-treat (ITT) effects evaluated
at event-time −1. Source: Restricted Census/ACS and SSA Numident file.
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CHAPTER II
Prep School for Poor Kids: The Long-Run Impacts of
Head Start on Human Capital and Economic
Self-Sufficiency
Abstract
This paper evaluates the long-run effects of Head Start using large-scale, restricted 2000-2013
Census-ACS data linked to date and place of birth in the Social Security Administration’s
Numident file. Using the county-level roll-out of Head Start between 1965 and 1980 and state
age-eligibility cutoffs for school entry, we find that childhood participation in Head Start is
associated with increases in adult human capital and economic self-sufficiency, including
a 0.29-year increase in schooling, a 2.1-percent increase in high-school completion, an 8.7-
percent increase in college enrollment, and a 19-percent increase in college completion. These
estimates imply sizable, long- term returns to investing in large-scale preschool programs.
JEL Codes: I2, J24, J6
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Convincing evidence on the longer-term impacts of scaled-up pre-k programs on
academic outcomes and school progress is sparse, precluding broad conclusions.
The evidence that does exist often shows that pre-k-induced improvements in
learning are detectable during elementary school, but studies also reveal null or
negative longer-term impacts for some programs.
– Brookings Pre-Kindergarten Task Force of Interdisciplinary Scientists, (Phillips et al.,
2017)
2.1 Introduction
In 1965, the U.S. began a new experiment in the provision of public preschool for disadvan-
taged children. The motivation was simple: “the creation of and assistance to preschool, day
care, or nursery centers for 3- to 5-year-olds will provide an opportunity for a head start
by canceling out deficiencies associated with poverty that are instrumental in school failure”
(United States Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 1964). The program that
ensued is the now-famous “Head Start,” a “prep school for poor kids” which aimed to help
millions of children escape poverty (Levitan, 1969).
More than fifty years later, Head Start is one of the most popular of the War on Poverty’s
programs, serving around 900,000 children annually at a cost of $9.6 billion in 2017 to the
federal government. Unlike expensive, small-scale “model” programs such as Perry Preschool
and Abecedarian, Head Start’s architects prioritized widespread access, calculating that a
massive preschool expansion would maximize its poverty-fighting (and political) benefits.
Skepticism about the quality of this large-scale preschool program coupled with difficulties
in evaluation have generated controversy about its short-term benefits for decades (Duncan
and Magnuson, 2013; Currie, 2001; Westinghouse Learning Corporation, 1969). Convincing
evidence regarding Head Start’s long-term effects has remained even more elusive, thanks to
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the lack of program randomization in its early years, small sample sizes of longitudinal sur-
veys, and the difficulty of measuring adults’ access to Head Start decades ago. Consequently,
the best estimates of Head Start’s long-term effects are limited by lingering concerns about
endogeneity (sibling comparison designs, Currie and Thomas (1995); Garces, Thomas and
Currie (2002); Deming (2009) and imprecision (measurement error in funding and access,
Ludwig and Miller (2007); Carneiro and Ginja (2014). Whether Head Start achieved its
goal of increasing life opportunities for children remains an open question. This paper uses
large-scale data to estimate Head Start’s long-term effects on human capital and economic
self-sufficiency. By linking the restricted long-form 2000 Census and 2001-2013 American
Community Surveys (ACS) to the exact date and place of birth from the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA) Numident file, we observe outcomes for one-quarter of U.S. adults
as well as a high quality measure of their access to and eligibility for Head Start as children.
The resulting sample is four orders of magnitude larger than longitudinal surveys, and in-
formation on place of birth and exact date of birth ameliorates (potentially non-classical)
measurement error in childhood access to Head Start.
Our research design exploits the county-level roll-out of Head Start programs from 1965 to
1980 at the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) (Levine, 1970; Bailey and Goodman-
Bacon, 2015; Bailey and Duquette, 2014; Bailey and Danziger, 2013; Bailey, 2012). This
approach exploits the well-documented “great administrative confusion” at the OEO (Levine,
1970), mitigating problems of measurement error in archival funding data (Barr and Gibbs,
2017) and concerns about the endogeneity of Head Start funding levels. An additional
strength of our design is that it leverages Head Start’s age-eligibility guidelines, comparing
cohorts who were age-eligible when it launched (ages 5 and younger) to cohorts born in the
same county that were age-ineligible (children 6 and older). The substantial variation in adult
outcomes means that even our large dataset does not permit the estimation of a regression
discontinuity or regression kink design, but our approach is based on similar assumptions.
Much like a regression kink design (Card et al., 2015), our key identifying assumption is that
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Head Start’s causal effect is the only reason for a change in the relationship between a child’s
age at the program’s launch and her outcomes as an adult. Because even our large-scale
data are not large enough to estimate a regression kink formally, we present both event-study
estimates as well as trend-break tests based on spline parameterizations.
The results suggest that Head Start increased the human capital and economic self-sufficiency
of disadvantaged children. An index of adult human capital rose by 10 percent of a standard
deviation among Head Start participants relative to children born in the same county who
were age 6 when the program began. Participating children achieved 0.29 more years of
education, were 2.1 percent more likely to complete high school, 8.7 percent more likely to
enroll in college, and 19 percent more likely to complete college. In addition, Head Start
increased economic self-sufficiency in adulthood by almost 4 percent of a standard deviation –
gains driven largely by a 12-percent reduction in adult poverty and a 29-percent reduction in
public assistance receipt. We find no evidence of reductions in incarceration. Heterogeneity
in Head Start’s effects suggests that they reflect, in part, practices outside of pre-school
curriculum. In particular, health screenings and referrals as well as more nutritious meals
appear to be important mechanisms for the program’s effects on disadvantaged children.
In addition, the effects of Head Start appear to be complement greater family and public
resources arising from a stronger economy. Overall, Head Start appears to have achieved the
goals of its early architects, both increasing children’s economic opportunities and reducing
poverty.
A final analysis quantifies the private, internal rates of return to dollars spent on Head
Start in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than using changes in wage income directly, we use the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to predict changes in earnings for the
relevant cohorts net of any ability differences (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Deming, 2009). Using
potential earnings accounts for Head Start-induced negative selection in men’s employment
(driven by reductions in disability) and positive selection in women’s employment (due to
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the income effect dominating for the least skilled women). This exercise suggests a private
internal rate of return to Head Start of 7.7 percent, which ranges from around 4 percent
for women to 11 percent for men. Using only savings on public assistance expenditures as
a conservative method to calculate the program’s social returns, we find that the internal
rate of return of putting one child through Head Start is 2.4 percent. In short, this paper’s
estimates suggest substantial long-run returns to America’s first scaled-up, public preschool
program. While the results do not imply that all of today’s large-scale preschool programs
work, they suggest that some less-than-model preschool programs may have lasting effects –
a key finding for current policy deliberations (Phillips et al., 2017).
2.2 The Launch of Head Start in the 1960s and Expected Ef-
fects
In the 1960s, the idea that preschool could improve children’s cognitive development was
revolutionary. Challenging the conventional notion that IQ was immutable and fixed at
birth, Joseph McVicker Hunt’s (1961) book, Intelligence and Experiences, persuasively ar-
gued that children’s intelligence could be significantly improved by altering their experiences.
Benjamin Bloom further emphasized that the first four years of children’s lives was a “critical
period,” noting that “intelligence appears to develop as much from conception to age 4 as it
does from age 4 to 18” (Bloom, 1964). This idea suggested an innovative strategy for poverty
prevention. Because poor children started school with significantly less educational back-
ground, comprehensive preschool could give them a “Head Start,” improving their success
in school and addressing a root cause of poverty.
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2.2.1 A Brief History of Head Start’s Launch
Funded by the OEO, Head Start began as an 8-week summer program in 1965. After a
successful first summer, President Lyndon Johnson announced that Head Start would become
a full-year program for children ages 3 to 5. The director of the OEO wrote 35,000 letters
to public health directors, school superintendents, mayors and social services commissioners
to encourage applications. The OEO also made a special effort to generate applications in
America’s 300 poorest counties (Ludwig and Miller, 2007).
Head Start’s political popularity led to an even faster launch than other War on Poverty
programs. Figure 2.1 shows the program’s quick expansion. By 1966, Head Start had begun
in more than 500 counties where over half of the nation’s children under age 6 resided. By
1970, federal expenditures on the program reached $326 million, or $2.1 billion in 2018 dollars
(OEO, 1970). This early expansion ensured that by 1970, Head Start existed in roughly half
of U.S. counties, putting preschool programs within a short drive for 83 percent of children
under age six (Appendix Table B.1).
The exact timing of Head Start’s launch depended on many idiosyncratic factors. The
OEO’s “wild sort of grant-making operation” has been well documented in oral histories
(Gillette 1996: 193) as well as in more recent, quantitative analyses (Bailey and Duquette,
2014). In the case of Head Start, other factors were key as well: how excited were local
institutions or politicians about the program? Was their there adequate and available space
to launch? Could the program be integrated within the public school system or would it
remain separate? The final result of the grant- making process and local constraints was
that Head Start began earlier in areas that were significantly more populous and urban
(Appendix Table B.2) – areas where more children could be served. In addition, urban areas
were funded earlier. After accounting for population and urban differences, the roll-out of
Head Start was not strongly affected by other county characteristics (Appendix Table B.3).
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Consistent with the historical evidence that this national program was rushed into existence,
exactly when Head Start began after 1965 does not appear to be systematically related to
pre-existing local characteristics.
2.2.2 Head Start’s Mission
Head Start’s architects adopted a holistic approach that aimed to develop children’s mental
and physical abilities by improving health; self-confidence; verbal, conceptual, and relational
skills; and raising parental involvement. Levitan (1969) notes that Head Start’s 1966-7
budget included early childhood education (daily activities and transport, 70 percent), health
services (including immunizations, screenings and medical referrals, 4 percent), and nutrition
(14 percent). Parent involvement, social services (e.g., helping families cope with crises), and
mental health services accounted for the remaining budget.
The expected effects of the program on adult outcomes could flow directly from the early
learning facilitated by the program. But the role of health services and nutrition may be im-
portant as well. Head Start’s vaccinations and screening (e.g., tuberculosis, diabetes, vision,
hearing) and referrals to local physicians may have prevented complications from childhood
diseases (North, 1979; Ludwig and Miller, 2007) and helped parents obtain simple, cost-
effective technologies to improve learning (e.g., eye glasses and hearing aids or antibiotics to
reduce hearing damage from ear infections). Healthy meals and snacks may have also raised
children’s ability to learn. Early estimates suggest that more than 40 percent of children
entering Head Start were receiving less than two-thirds of the recommended allotment of
iron, and 10 percent were extremely deprived in terms of their daily calories (Fosburg et al.,
1984). Among children who received blood tests in the 1968 full-year program, 15 percent
were found to be anemic (Office of Child Development , DHEW). Reducing these nutritional
deficiencies could also translate into significant gains in educational achievement in both the
short and longer term (Frisvold, 2015).
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The challenges of quickly starting a new national program meant that implementation often
deviated from ideals. Not only did Head Start lack curricular standardization, but programs
struggled to find high-quality teachers to achieve the suggested pupil-to-teacher ratio of 15:1.
As a practical solution many centers relied on para-professionals, most of whom lacked post-
secondary education; thirty percent had not finished high school (Hechinger, 1966; Braun
and Edwards, 1972). In addition, many components of Head Start phased in slowly. For
instance, the OEO wrote that in 1965, “the proportion of children receiving treatment for
conditions discovered in Head Start medical and dental examinations ... was probably under
20 percent. It rose to over 65 percent in 1966, and in 1967 we fully expect it to have reached
over 90 percent” (OEO, 1967).
Consequently, Head Start in its earliest years was far from a model preschool program. Nev-
ertheless, even the less-than-ideal implementation of Head Start was likely higher quality
than the alternatives available to low income children in the 1960s (Currie, 2001). Impor-
tantly, similar concerns hold today: Head Start’s quality score from the National Institute
for Early Education Research places Head Start program quality around the median of the
score distribution (Espinosa, 2002) but the program may still be much better than informal
child care (Loeb, 2016).
2.3 Literature Regarding the Long-Term Effects of Head Start
Previous evaluations of Head Start provide suggestive evidence of the program’s long-term
effects on human capital and economic self-sufficiency. One pioneering approach was the
use of family fixed effects with longitudinal data. Building on work by Currie and Thomas
(1995), Garces, Thomas and Currie (2002) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
to compare children who participated in Head Start to their siblings who did not. They show
that Head Start increased high school graduation rates and college enrollment among whites
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and reduced arrest rates among blacks. Using a similar research design for more recent
cohorts in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Deming (2009) finds that
Head Start participation had large and positive effects on a summary index of adult outcomes
(including high school graduation, college attendance, “idleness,” crime, teen parenthood,
and health status). Well-known critiques caution that sibling comparisons may suffer from
sources of endogeneity bias (Griliches, 1979; Bound and Solon, 1999). In addition, small
sample sizes in longitudinal surveys may provide unreliable estimates of Head Start’s effects
(Grosz, Miller and Shenhav, 2017).
More recent work exploits shifts in access to Head Start using three distinct research designs.
The path-breaking application of RD in Ludwig and Miller (2007) exploited the OEO’s
special effort to generate grant proposals from the 300 poorest counties. Comparing the
outcomes of children on either side of this threshold, they find evidence that Head Start
reduced childhood mortality and increased the receipt of high-school degrees and college
enrollment. However, because the 1990 and 2000 Censuses required them to use county of
residence in adulthood to proxy for childhood Head Start access, measurement error causes
their education results to be sensitive to specification and often statistically insignificant.
Carneiro and Ginja (2014) use an RD in state-, year-, and household-based income eligibility
cutoffs for more recent Head Start programs. They find that Head Start decreased behavioral
problems, the prevalence of some health conditions (including obesity) between the ages of 12
and 17, and crime rates around age 20. They find a positive though statistically insignificant
effect on receiving a high-school diploma as well as suggestive evidence that Head Start
reduced college enrollment.
In work closely related to this paper, three studies make use of county-year variation in Head
Start funding in the 1960s and 1970s to quantify the program’s long-term effects. Using a
sample of likely eligible children from the NLSY, Thompson (2017) finds that greater funding
for Head Start at ages 3 to 6 raised college graduation rates, reduced the incidence of health
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limitations, and tended to raise adult household income. Focusing on a “high impact”
sample, Johnson and Jackson (2017) find that an average level of Head Start and education
spending increases the likelihood that children graduated from high school by 8 p ercentage
points and gained 0.39 years of schooling. These children also experienced a 7.8 log-point
increase in adult wages, a 14.4 log-point increase in adult family income at ages 20 to 50, a 3.6
percentage-point reduction in poverty at ages 20 to 50, and a 3 percentage-point reduction
in adult incarceration. Finally, Barr and Gibbs (2017) examine the intergenerational effects
of Head Start using the NLSY and two research designs: family fixed effects and variation
in program availability across birth counties (also referred to as “roll-out”). To alleviate
concerns about the endogeneity of funding levels and measurement error in the National
Archives data, their roll-out design uses a binary measure of Head Start access that is equal
to one if funding exceeds the 10th percentile of observed funding per four-year-old. They
find evidence of large first-generation effects on women (including a gain of a half a year of
schooling) and large second-generation effects on their children’s high school graduation and
completed education.
2.4 Data and Research Design
This study combines the long-form 2000 Census and 2001-2013 ACS with the SSA’s Nu-
mident file to shed new light on Head Start’s long-term effects. The Census/ACS data
represent almost one quarter of the U.S. population and are four orders of magnitude larger
than previously used longitudinal samples. Another advantage of these combined data is
that the Numident contains county of birth (rather than adulthood residence) and exact
date of birth, which allows a high-quality proxy for Head Start access and age eligibility
in childhood. The data’s main disadvantage is that they contain no information on family
background. This lack of covariates means that we cannot model many determinants of
adult outcomes – which limits precision even in this large dataset – or model treatment
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effect heterogeneity by childhood characteristics.
Our sample is comprised of children born from 1950 to 1980 in U.S. states where the school-
entry age cutoff is known. We additionally limit our sample to individuals who are in their
prime earning years (ages 25 to 54). We collapse these data to means by birth year, survey
year, county of birth, and school age. We also weight our regressions using the number
of observations in each cell (Solon, Haider and Wooldridge, 2015). To minimize disclosure
concerns at the Census Bureau, we use only observations with non-allocated and non-missing
values for all outcomes.
Our outcomes of interest are summary measures of human capital and economic self-sufficiency,
which permit tests of co-movements of related adult outcomes and limit the number of statis-
tical tests (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007). A shortcoming of this approach is that, because
indices weight each component equally, large changes in one dimension are averaged with
potentially opposite-signed or zero effects in other dimensions. We, therefore, also examine
the individual index components. The human capital index includes four binary variables
indicating achievement of a given level of education or greater: high school or GED, some
college, a 4-year college degree, and a professional or doctoral degree; years of schooling, and
an indicator for working in a professional occupation. Our index of self-sufficiency includes
binary indicators of employment, poverty status, income from public sources, family income,
and income from other non-governmental sources; continuous measures of weeks worked,
usual hours worked, the log of labor income, log of other income from non-governmental
sources, and log ratio of family income to the federal poverty threshold.
2.4.1 Measuring Exposure to Head Start
Combining data on the launch of Head Start programs from Bailey and Goodman-Bacon
(2015) with the Census/ACS-Numident permits two refinements to previously used research
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designs Barr and Gibbs (2017); Johnson and Jackson (2017); Thompson (2017). First, we use
only variation in the launch of the Head Start program rather than a continuous measure of
Head Start spending. This refinement (1) addresses the potential endogeneity of Head Start
funding levels to the program’s performance and (2) sidesteps issues of measurement error
in the National Archives grant data (Barr and Gibbs, 2017). Second, we examine changes
in outcomes for children who were age-eligible for Head Start (ages 3-5 or younger) relative
to those who were age-ineligible (ages 6+) when it launched, allowing for the effects to vary
by the number of years each cohort was potentially eligible. Age eligibility is based on exact
date of birth in the Numident and school-entry age cutoffs, which alleviates measurement
error in defining the potential treatment and control groups. Finally, our large dataset allows
us to use state-by-birth-year fixed effects to adjust estimates for state economic and policy
changes that could have affected children’s outcomes independently of Head Start. Our
identifying assumption in the analysis that follows is that the causal effect of Head Start is
the only reason for a change in the relationship between a child’s age at the program’s launch
and her outcomes as an adult. (See Appendix for more description of our sample.)
2.4.2 Event-Study Regression Model
Our research design uses a flexible event-study framework and roll-out of Head Start to
estimate the effect of exposure to Head Start on long-term human capital and economic
outcomes,
Ybct = θc + αt + δs(c)b +Z
′
cbβ +HeadStartc
[
Age′bs(c)φ
]
+ bct (2.1)
Children’s birth years are indexed by b = 1950−1980, county of birth by c, and Census/ACS
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year by t = 2000− 2013. Specifications include fixed effects for county of birth, θc, year, αt,
and state-by-birth-year, δs(c)b, which, respectively, capture time-invariant differences across
counties, national changes affecting all individuals, and changes in state policies that differ-
entially affect birth cohorts. Although covariates matter little, we follow the literature and
include county characteristics, Zc interacted with a linear trend in year of birth, b (Hoynes,
Page and Stevens, 2011; Bailey, 2012; Bailey and Goodman-Bacon, 2015).
HeadStartc is a binary variable equal to 1 if a child was born in a county that received a
Head Start grant before 1980. Age is a set of dummy variables for a child’s “school age”
at the time of Head Start’s launch, 1(T ∗c − b = a) where a = −15 to 30 (or T ∗c = 1965 and
b = 1980 to T ∗c = 1980 and b = 1950) and T
∗
c is the year Head Start began in county c.
We omit school age 6 (age 6 before the school entry cut-off date), because these children
would have been unlikely to have attended Head Start rather than public school. Our
point estimates of interest, φ, describe the evolution of the intent-to-treat (ITT) effects of
Head Start on long-term human capital and economic self-sufficiency. Standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for an arbitrary within-birth-county covariance
structure (Arellano, 1987; Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). In our tables, we also
report p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis testing using the Bonferroni-Holm method
in our tables (Holm, 1979; Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer, 2007).
2.4.3 Expected Effects of Exposure to Head Start by Age at Launch
The event-study model provides a flexible approach that imposes few restrictions on the
relationship between Head Start and adult outcomes. Although economic theory does not
make predictions as to the magnitudes of the event-study coefficients, the program’s phased
implementation and the greater potential for some children to enroll (due to multiple years
of exposure) predict a specific pattern. Figure 2.2 plots this pattern under the following set
of assumptions.
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First, if we assume Head Start had no effect on children who were over age 5 when the
program launched, then the relationship between adult outcomes and Head Start for these
children should be zero. This is the equivalent to a test for a pre-trend in our analysis and
is illustrated as a flat line for children ages 6 to 12 in Figure 2.2A.
Second, if Head Start has a positive causal effect on adult outcomes, we expect to see a
change in those outcomes for children under age 5 when it launched, because these cohorts
would have been the first to have been age-eligible and have access. This would not result
in an immediate shift in the level of outcomes (akin to a regression discontinuity, RD) but
rather a shift in the slope (akin to a regression kink, RK). The reason is that Head Start’s
capacity grew over time, both because new programs were added but also as individual
programs matured. Program quality also increased over time with better hiring and training
of teachers, curriculum development, and the implementation of auxiliary services (e.g.,
health). Studies of other War on Poverty programs such as family planning or community
health centers suggest that many of these programs reached maturity around 4 to 5 years after
launch (Bailey, 2012; Bailey and Goodman-Bacon, 2015). Figure 2.2A illustrates this as the
implementation curve (line with square markers), which rises from zero to 100 percent.
In addition to these gradual changes in program quality and capacity, we also expect larger
effects for children who were younger when Head Start launched, simply because they would
have been age-eligible for a larger share of their preschool years. For instance, a child 5 years
old when Head Start launched could participate for at most one year, whereas a 3-year-old
child would be age-eligible for three years. This does not mean that the 3-year-old enrolled
for more than one year. However, it is more likely that a child enrolls if s/he had three years
to do so. Figure 2.2A illustrates this cumulative potential access to Head Start as a linear
relationship (dashed line with circle markers), but differences in the likelihood of enrollment
by age could make this relationship more S-shaped as well (because enrollment in the early
years was more likely at ages 4 than 5).
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The combination of phased implementation and cumulative potential access to Head Start
implies a non-linear change in the relationship between age at Head Start launch and adult
outcomes (solid, bold line). In Figure 2.2A’s stylized example, children ages -1 or younger at
Head Start’s launch would have been age-eligible for a fully implemented program for each of
their three years of eligibility. Assuming that Head Start did not continue to mature and that
it did not have any complementarities with other War on Poverty programs, the relationship
should level off for children ages -1 or younger at launch, because all cohorts born after this
would have had the same potential exposure to Head Start as the -1 cohort.
Note, however, that Figure 2.2B shows how relaxing two assumptions implies a slightly
different shape. First, allowing for effects on children ages 6 and older implies that the
curve would begin to slope up before age 6. This is possible because 10 percent of children
in full-year Head Start were 6 or older (Vinovskis, 2005), and age-ineligible children could
still benefit from their younger siblings’ participation (Garces, Thomas and Currie, 2002).
Because our subsequent analysis standardizes the effects at age 6 to zero, this relationship
would appear as the flat part of the line falling below zero. Second, if the Head Start program
continued to mature after 5 years or was complemented by other programs (e.g., Goodman-
Bacon (2018) notes that Medicaid continued to expand into the 1970s), we would expect to
see a slope for cohorts ages -1 and younger when the program launched.
2.4.4 Spline Summary Specification
Our event-study estimates impose none of the restrictions used to outline the expected
effects of Head Start in Figure 2.2. However, we expect estimates from this flexible event-
study specification to be noisy, in part because so many unobserved factors determine adult
outcomes. To improve precision and test formally for trend breaks, we use Figure 2.2’s
predictions to guide the specification of a three-part spline with knots at ages 6 and -1. We
implement this by replacing the Age′bs(c) in equation 2.1 with components of the spline in
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age, a = T ∗c − b:
Ybct = θc + αt + δs(c)b +Z
′
cbβ +HeadStartc [D
′
cbρ1 + aD
′
cbρ2] + bct (2.2)
where D′cb is a vector of dummy variables, 1(−10 ≤ a ≤ −1), 1(−1 ≤ a ≤ 6), 1(6 ≤ a ≤ 15),
1(a < −10), and 1(15 > a) and the other variables remain as previously defined. We
constrain the estimates of ρ1 and ρ2 to ensure that the spline joins at a = 6 and −1. While
the spline specification is more restrictive than our flexible event-study, it improves precision
by imposing restrictions that should be true. The spline allows a parsimonious method to
test for a pre-trend (captured in the slope of the segment for 1(6 ≤ a ≤ 15)) as well as
a formal trend-break test between components 1(6 ≤ a ≤ 15) and 1(−1 ≤ a ≤ 6). This
final test captures whether the relationship between adult outcomes and age at Head Start’s
introductions changes at age 6 – the age at which older children tend to stop participating
in Head Start and begin first grade.
2.5 Tests of Identifying Assumptions
The research design outlined in the previous section relies on two crucial assumptions: (1)
the launch of a Head Start program increased participation in Head Start and (2) the launch
of a Head Start program did not coincide with other county-level changes that would af-
fect the outcomes of preschool children. This section provides further evidence on both
assumptions.
60
2.5.1 How Much Did Head Start Increase Preschool Enrollment?
While there is little doubt that introducing a Head Start program increased children’s at-
tendance in this program, the magnitude of this relationship net of crowd-out is crucial for
interpreting the ITT effects recovered in equations 2.1 and 2.2. Administrative data suggest
that the launch of a Head Start program significantly increased children’s enrollment. The
OEO reported that full-year Head Start served over 600,000 children before 1968, rising
from 20,000 children in 1965, to 160,000 in 1966, to around 215,000 in 1967 and 1968 (OEO
1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1970). About 257,700 children attended full-year Head Start in
1970. Three-quarters of the children were aged 4 or 5, three-quarters were nonwhite, and 62
percent came from families with less than $4,000 in annual income. Between 1971 and 1978,
enrollment and directory information suggest that the average county with a Head Start
program served roughly 309 children. These sources imply that the average Head Start pro-
gram served from about 10 percent of resident age-eligible children in 1971 to 15.8 percent
in 1978.
If Head Start substituted for private preschool for some children (Cascio and Schanzenbach,
2013; Kline and Walters, 2016; Bassok, Fitzpatrick and Loeb, 2014), administrative data
may overstate the role of Head Start programs in increasing exposure to preschool. To
examine this possibility, we use the 1970 Census, which was the first to ask children younger
than age 5 about school enrollment as of February 1 – a date during the school year, which
should capture enrollment in full-year Head Start. The Census data show that four-year-old
children in counties without Head Start programs were 3.4 percentage points less likely to be
enrolled in school (16.8 versus 20.2 percentage points, see Figure B.1). Five-year-old children
were 17 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in school (48.9 versus 65.9 percentage
points). These gaps are 5.9 percentage points among 4 year olds and 21.3 percentage points
among 5 year olds when looking only at children of mothers with less than a high school
education.
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We use a linear probability model to adjust these gaps for state fixed effects (to account
for age-invariant, state-level factors that determine the local supply of preschools) and 1960
county characteristics (share of county population in urban areas, in rural areas, under 5
years of age, 65 or older, nonwhite, with 12 or more years of education, with less than 4
years of education, in households with income less than $3,000, in households with incomes
greater than $10,000, local government expenditures, income per capita, and whether the
county was among the 300 poorest counties). Details are presented in Appendix B.6 and
summarized here for parsimony. The regression results show that school enrollment was 14.9
percentage points higher for all five year olds, 15.1 percentage points higher for boys, and
14.5 percentage points higher for girls (Appendix Table B.5). These results are highly robust
to the inclusion (or exclusion) of different covariates.
Consistent with crowd-out being minimal, the 14.9 percent increase in enrollment in the
Census is only slightly smaller than the 15.8 percent contained in administrative data. This
estimate is also comparable to other studies. Garces, Thomas and Currie (2002) estimates
the national Head Start participation rate was between 10 percent and 17 percent for the 1964
to 1970 cohorts in the PSID (p. 1002). A slightly higher estimate comes from Ludwig and
Miller (2007), who estimate that children’s enrollment in Head Start was 17 percentage points
higher at the 300-poorest county discontinuity in the 1988 National Educational Longitudinal
Survey (NELS).
Based on this evidence, we use our best estimate of 0.149 to transform the ITT effects
from our event-study and spline specifications into average treatment-effects-on-the-treated
(ATET). We also construct confidence intervals using a parametric bootstrap procedure
with 10,000 independent draws from normal distributions with means and standard devia-
tions equal to the point estimates and standard errors from the reduced-form and first-stage
estimates (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).
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2.5.2 Did Head Start’s Launch Correspond to Other Policy Changes?
Another key assumption of our analysis is that the launch of a Head Start program is the only
reason why a cohort’s adult outcomes changed for age-eligible children relative to 6+ year
olds. The decentralization of U.S. governance and the process of applying for OEO grants
makes it unlikely that communities across the nation coordinated in their grant applications.
More worrisome is that OEO could have provided multiple grants to a community in the same
year, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of Head Start from other OEO programs.
To test this hypothesis, we use information on other War on Poverty programs compiled
from the National Archives and estimate regressions similar to equation 2.1. In particular,
we replace the dependent variable with an indicator for receiving funding in county c in
fiscal year t, or Yct = θc + δs(c)t +X
′
ctβ +
∑K
k φk1(t− T ∗c = k) + cbt. We also include county
and state-year fixed effects, θc and δs(c)t, and county level covariates, Xct, as we do in our
primary regression specifications. Our variable of interest is event-time, t−T ∗c = k, the year
of observation relative to the date Head Start launched (the year before Head Start began,
k = −1, is omitted).
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between the launch of Head Start and the launch of other
OEO programs. As expected, 100 percent of treated counties in our sample first received
a Head Start grant in event-year 0. This is by design. In subsequent years, the share of
counties receiving a Head Start grant tapers off to 70 percent after around five years – this
reflects the fact that some counties received multi-year grants and also the fact that not all
of the early programs continued.
For our estimates to be confounded by changes in other federal funding, these funding changes
would need to happen around the time Head Start launched, or event-year 0. However, our
analysis of Food Stamps, Community Health Centers, and other child health programs show
no such pattern. The one program that shows a small change in funding after Head Start
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began is the CAP health project. Importantly for our inferences, funding was very small for
this program (around $8 in 2013 dollars per person; by contrast, annual Head Start funding
was nearly $1,500 per 4-year-old during the same period). Furthermore, there is little reason
to think this program would affect children who were 5 or younger but not those who were 6.
Although we cannot rule out funding changes in programs we do not measure, these patterns
provide little evidence that our research design is confounded by other OEO programs.
2.6 Head Start’s Effects on Human Capital
Figure 2.4 plots the event-study estimates for all outcomes in the human capital index for the
set of compositionally balanced county-birth-cohorts, or individuals ages 15 to as young as -1
when Head Start launched. The solid line plots the event-study estimates. Consistent with
the patterns anticipated in Figure 2.2, the human capital index and each of its components
exhibit little relationship to adult outcomes for cohorts ages 6 to 15 when Head Start launched
(i.e., there is little evidence of a pre-trend among ineligible cohorts). However, the index and
many of its subcomponents exhibit a trend-break around age 6, suggesting that access to
Head Start improved the human capital of adults. Notably, this relationship is not as sharp
as in regression kink designs, because (1) school age-entry cutoffs were not strictly enforced,
(2) older children ages 6 and 7 participated in Head Start (although at lower rates), and
(3) older siblings of participants may have benefited indirectly from their younger sibling’s
involvement. Any benefits of Head Start for these other ages would lead the event-study
estimates for ages higher than 6 to fall slightly below zero, as the data show. They also
weaken the visual evidence and formal tests for a trend-break at exactly age 6.
Table 2.1 summarizes both the event-study and spline estimates at -1. Column 1 presents
the mean and standard deviation of the outcome for cohorts ages 6 and 7 at the time
of Head Start’s launch (our control group). Column 2, which shows the ITT-event-study
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estimate at -1 (our estimate for cohorts that were age eligible for up to three years for a
fully implemented program), suggests that Head Start significantly improved adult human
capital. The standardized index increases by 1.5 percent of a standard deviation for the
fully exposed cohort and 10 percent of a standard deviation for treated children (column 6).
Across outcomes, column 3’s ITT-spline estimates are identical to those in column 2 to the
hundredth.
Supporting the impression left by the event-study plots, column 4 shows that a formal test
for pre-trend (ages 6 to 15), the slope estimate for the spline component for ages 6 to 15).
Figure 2.5 additionally plots the magnitude of the t-tests for the pre-trend. For the index
and for each of its subcomponents, the data find no evidence of a pre-trend – a conclusion
strengthened by Bonferroni-Holm (BH) p-value adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing.
T-tests for pre-trends fail to reject the slope is zero in all cases. However, column 5 of Table
2.1 and Figure 2.5 shows that the data reject the null hypothesis of no trend-break at age 6
for the adult human capital index at the 1-percent level. With the exception of high school
graduation (which is just below the threshold for statistical significance at the 10-percent
level), the data show evidence of a trend break for each of the subcomponents of the human
capital index. It appears that , even with Head Start’s spill-overs to children older than 6,
the relationship between adult human capital changed for children age-eligible for Head Start
relative to children in the same county who were old enough to enroll in first grade.
The data show strong effects on some of the most commonly studied outcomes in the
preschool literature, including both high school graduation and college enrollment. Fig-
ure 2.4B and Table 2.1 show that treated children were 1.9 percentage points more likely
to complete high school/GED (column 6) – a 2.1-percent increase relative to the control
mean (column 7). The magnitude of this estimate is precisely estimated, but smaller than
other estimates of Head Start’s effects in the literature. Figure 2.6A shows that the effect is
roughly half the size of Garces, Thomas and Currie (2002)’s sibling comparison in the PSID
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and Thompson (2017)’s spending design in the NLSY. In addition, it is one-fifth the size of
Johnson and Jackson (2017)’s spending design estimates for the very disadvantaged sample
in the PSID; and one-ninth the size of Ludwig and Miller (2007)’s RD estimates using the
Census. (It is one quarter the size of Deming (2009)’s sibling comparison for Head Start
in the 1990s for more recent cohorts.) Although our estimate falls within the confidence
intervals of previous studies, this reflects the imprecision of those estimates.
Figure 2.4C and Table 2.1 also shows a statistically significant effect of Head Start on college
enrollment. Head Start raised college enrollment by 5.4 percentage points, or 8.7 percent.
This estimate is half the size of Garces, Thomas and Currie (2002) and one quarter the
size of Ludwig and Miller (2007) (Figure 2.6B). (The magnitude of the increase in college
enrollment of 0.05 is only slightly smaller than Deming (2009)’s NLSY sibling comparison
for Head Start in the 1990s.) Again, consistent with the visual impression of a trend break
in Figure 2.4C, we find no evidence of a pre-trend for children older than 6 at launch and
reject the null hypothesis of no trend break at age 6 at the 5-percent level.
In addition to generating more precise estimates for these commonly studied outcomes, our
large-scale data permit a novel evaluation of the effects of Head Start on other dimensions of
human capital, including college completion or higher degrees, which previous data have not
been able to detect. Table 2.1 shows that participating children achieved 19 percent higher
college graduation rates (the trend break is statistically significant at the 1-percent level).
These estimates are one-quarter to one-fifth the size of those found for the Abecedarian
Project (Currie, 2001; Barnett and Masse, 2007; Duncan and Magnuson, 2013). Similarly,
completion of professional or doctoral degrees increased by 50 percent among treated chil-
dren, although evidence of a significant pre-trend caution against a causal interpretation
(this is also consistent with Figure 2.4F). These gains across the education distribution are
summarized in a 0.29-year increase in schooling. This estimate is smaller than Johnson
and Jackson (2017)’s estimate of 0.52 years for very disadvantaged children, but it is highly
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statistically significant and is not driven by a pre-trend.
These large effects on college and higher degrees may be surprising, given that no other study
of preschool has documented effects on post-secondary education. This lack of evidence may
reflect, in part, the small longitudinal samples or the small scale of model preschool pro-
grams. Differences in the participating children may also matter. Abecedarian and Perry’s
participants were very disadvantaged children and mostly black, and Perry’s participants had
low IQs. In contrast, Head Start was not exclusively for poor, African-American, or low-IQ
children. Consequently, Head Start’s participants in the 1960s and 1970s likely faced fewer
socio-economic and cognitive disadvantages and less racism relative to model programs. Dif-
ferences in the background characteristics of Head Start’s participants make it less surprising
that they experienced gains in post-secondary education.
Because analyses of model preschool programs have found different educational effects for
boys, Table 2.2 stratifies our sample by sex. Among participating men, the human capital
index increased by a statistically significant 14 percent of a standard deviation. For this
group, high school completion rose by a statistically insignificant 2.7 percent, college at-
tendance rose by 13 percent, and college completion rose by 27 percent. The high school
estimates are smaller than others in the literature, but the college attendance estimates tend
to be larger. Head Start cumulatively raised years of education among treated men by 0.41
years and the likelihood of completing a professional/doctoral degree by 59 percent. The
evidence suggests that men treated with Head Start were 19 percent more likely to hold
professional jobs.
The human capital index increased by less among women, at only 7 percent of a standard
deviation. Completion of high school (or a GED) rose by a statistically insignificant 1.5 per-
cent, and college attendance rose by 5.7 percent (although the trend-break is not statistically
significant). For women, changes in the human capital index appear driven by increases in
higher degrees, including an 11-percent increase college completion and 36-percent increase
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in professional degrees. Treated women’s schooling rose by 0.17 years and their likelihood of
holding a professional job rose by 9.5 percent.
Our Appendix Tables B.7-B.8 report estimates of Head Start’s effects on human capital by
race. Unfortunately, even our large sample size is too small to precisely quantify effects by
race, because less than 1/6 of our sample is nonwhite and, unlike longitudinal data, we have
no background covariates to model the many other determinants of adult outcomes. The
broad patterns in these estimates suggest that Head Start’s effects are largest among white
men (13 percent of a standard deviation) and smaller among white and non-white women
(5-6 percent of a standard deviation, respectively). Effects for non-white men were generally
small and imprecise.
2.7 Head Start’s Effects on Economic Self-Sufficiency
The substantial effects of Head Start on human capital suggest a potential for effects on
economic self-sufficiency. Figure 2.7A plots the event study estimates for the self-sufficiency
index, and Table 2.3 shows that an index of economic self-sufficiency aggregated over both
sexes was by 4 percent of a standard deviation higher than for children ages 6-7 at the time
Head Start began. Consistent with Head Start affecting less skilled individuals, the program
decreased the likelihood of adult poverty by 12 percent and receipt of public assistance
income by 29 percent, though these results are imprecise. Figure 2.7B and 2.7C show striking
evidence of a trend break at age 6, which is also reflected in column 5 of Table 2.3 and in
Figure 2.6B. However, there is little effect of Head Start on labor-force participation or wage
income. (We omit the event study estimates for these outcomes for parsimony, because they
are noisy and show no effect.) Null effects for wages and labor-force participation also affect
the magnitude of the change and the trend-break in the economic self-sufficiency index,
which does not exhibit the sharp trend-break at age 6 as in the human capital outcomes.
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This result may reflect the fact that men’s and women’s work effort changed in offsetting
ways, resulting in selection for both groups. Whereas Head Start’s effect on men’s human
capital may have led them to increase employment (e.g., the substitution effect dominates),
the reverse may be true for women (e.g., the income effect dominates as more education
allows them to marry higher-earning men).
Table 2.4 stratifies our sample by sex and provides evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Because the self-sufficiency estimates are noisier and stratifying by sex reduces sample sizes,
we focus our discussion on the spline estimates. For treated men, the self-sufficiency index
increased by 3 percent of a standard deviation. We also find positive effects of Head Start
exposure on both the extensive and intensive margins of men’s labor-force participation.
Treated men were 2.1 percent more likely to have worked for pay (column 7), worked an
average of one more week and one more hour per week (column 6). Consistent with these
estimates reflecting the causal effect of Head Start, we find no evidence of a pre-trend and
a marginally significant trend-break at age 6, which does not survive the Bonferroni-Holm
standard error correction. At first glance, it is curious that the combined effects of increased
human capital and labor-force participation do not appear to have affected annual wages.
Upon further investigation, this appears consistent with Head Start inducing negative selec-
tion into the labor-force: the marginal participants tended to be less skilled, and therefore
lowered the cohort’s wages on average. Head Start had little effect on men’s poverty, but the
program is associated with a 27-percent decline in public assistance receipt among treated
men. Reductions in public assistance are also consistent with negative selection, because
male public assistance recipients receive high rates of disability income.
The pattern is different for women. The self-sufficiency index increased by 4 percent of a
standard deviation among women treated with Head Start, largely driven by a 28-percent re-
duction in public assistance receipt and a 16-percent reduction in poverty. However, women’s
labor-force participation on the extensive and intensive margins fell slightly, albeit not signif-
69
icantly. These reductions in work appear to have increased annual wages of working women
by around 4 percent, which is consistent with Head Start inducing positive selection (e.g.,
less-skilled women opting out). In our conclusion, we examine the effects of negative selection
among men and positive selection among women.
As with the human capital outcomes, our Appendix Tables B.10-B.11 report estimates of
Head Start’s effects on self-sufficiency by race and sex. Similarly, the effects for nonwhites
are generally statistically insignificant, owing to the fact that nonwhites comprise less than
15 percent of the sample and that we have few background characteristics to model the
considerable variation in outcomes. As with human capital, the patterns of these estimates
suggest that Head Start’s effects on self-sufficiency are largest among white men and women
(3 and 4 percent of a standard deviation, respectively).
2.8 Heterogeneity in Head Start’s Long-Run Effect
This final section seeks to shed light on the potential mechanisms for Head Start’s effects by
examining how the estimates vary with access to other public programs and local economic
conditions. We implement this analysis by interacting a binary indicator for whether cohorts
lived in counties with “high” or “low” exposure to a program with the spline components
in equation (2), where “high” is equal to one for counties above the median in the charac-
teristics and 0 otherwise. We use only the main indices for human capital and economic
self-sufficiency as the dependent variables. We caution that the lack of randomization of
alternative programs and conditions means that, while these relationships are suggestive,
they should not be interpreted as causal. Additionally, uncertainty about how program
enrollment varied means these estimates are less precise than desired. We nevertheless pro-
vide additional guidance about the magnitudes of the ATET effects using our estimates of
differential take-up across locations to scale our ITT estimates.
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We first investigate the hypothesis that Head Start’s long-run effects relate to their comple-
mentarities with other health programs for disadvantaged children. If health screening and
referrals to health services (a sizable share of Head Start’s budget) played a role in driving
long-term effects, we would expect Head Start’s effects to be larger for children with greater
access to these health services through community health centers (CHCs) and/or Medicaid.
(We would also expect the selection effects on wages to mirror those we observe for men
in Table 2.4.) Table 2.5 provides suggestive evidence of this mechanism, showing that the
ATETs of Head Start for human capital were slightly larger in areas with CHCs and three
times as large in states where more children were eligible for Medicaid (17 percent increase
relative to 5 percent for less-exposed children). The 95-percent confidence interval in the
difference between these two treatment effects on the treated suggests we can reject the null
hypothesis of equal effects. Consistent with health services bringing more previously disabled
workers into the labor market, Head Start’s ATETs on economic self-sufficiency are more
muted in locations with greater health services.
A related hypothesis is that Head Start affected adult outcomes by providing healthy meals
and snacks, improving child nutrition which increased both health and learning. If nutrition
is an important mechanism for Head Start’s long-run effects, we would expect the program’s
effects to be smaller for children with greater access to Food Stamps, which also supported
the provision of healthy meals. Consistent with this, Table 2.5 shows that children partici-
pating in Head Start with more access to Food Stamps experienced smaller – although still
statistically significant – gains in human capital and economic self-sufficiency. This suggests
that the Food Stamps program provided a partial substitute for Head Start’s nutritional
component.
The OEO’s larger effort to set up Head Start programs in the poorest 300 counties could also
lead the Head Start program to be more intensive in these areas, potentially having larger
effects. For this test, we report the poorest 300 counties in the column for “above median”
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and report the effects for counties outside this group in the column “below median.” While
Table 2.5 shows little evidence of differential effects on human capital across these two groups
of counties, there is suggestive evidence that children in poorer counties benefitted more in
terms of their economic self-sufficiency-although this difference is imprecise.
A final hypothesis is that Head Start’s effects should be larger in areas with greater sub-
sequent economic growth. Strong economic conditions should both increase the resources
of children’s parents, the provision of public goods (such as schools), and create stronger
incentives for children to invest in themselves, as children could expect higher and more
certain returns. Rather than using actual economic growth (that may be endogenous), we
use predicted economic growth between 1965 and 1985. Table 2.5 suggests that the benefits
of a strong economy complement Head Start’s effects. The ATETs of Head Start for human
capital were twice as large in areas with strong predicted economic growth than in areas with
weaker predicted economic growth. The ATETs of Head Start for economic self-sufficiency
were fifty percent larger large in areas with strong predicted economic growth.
All in all, these results suggest that Head Start’s long-run effects may be driven by many
factors beyond a preschool curriculum, including health screenings and referrals and more
nutritious meals for an a population thatwith otherwise may have been under-nourished and
had little access to health care and under-nourished. Unsurprisingly, the effects of Head
Start appear to be complementary to the family and public resources arising from a stronger
economy.
2.9 New Evidence on the Long-Term Returns to Head Start
Over the past 20 years, substantial evidence has accumulated that model preschool programs
have sizable economic returns (Almond and Currie, 2011; Duncan and Magnuson, 2013;
Heckman et al., 2010; Cunha and Heckman, 2007). However, convincing evidence on the long-
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run returns to larger-scale, public preschool has remained sparse (Phillips et al., 2017).
Using large-scale restricted Census/ACS data, this paper provides new evidence of the long-
term effects of Head Start, the nation’s longest-running, large-scale public preschool program.
We find that Head Start had large effects on participants’ human capital. Head Start chil-
dren achieved 0.29 more years of schooling, reflecting the fact that they were 2.1 percent
more likely to complete high school, 8.7 percent more likely to enroll in college, and 19 per-
cent more likely to complete college. A second finding is that Head Start increased adult
self-sufficiency, reducing the likelihood of adult poverty by 12 percent and public assistance
receipt by 29 percent. Heterogeneity tests suggest that these long-run effects may reflect
many aspects of the Head Start program beyond its curriculum: health screenings and refer-
rals and more nutritious meals appear to be important mechanisms for the program’s effects
on disadvantaged children. In addition, the effects of Head Start appear to be complement
greater family and public resources arising from a stronger economy.
A full accounting of the costs and benefits of Head Start is beyond the scope of this paper,
but we summarize the implications of our estimates using potential earnings to account for
selection (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Deming, 2009). Following Neal and Johnson (1996) and
Deming (2009), the advantage of this approach is that it allows us to account for the effects
of Head Start on employment (which differed for women and men). Like Deming, we use the
NLSY79 to predict wages for individuals born from 1957 to 1965 (ages 14 to 22 in 1979) –
a time frame that overlaps our Census/ACS analysis. The NLSY data allow us to estimate
the relationship between wages and components of the human capital and economic self-
sufficiency indices after flexibly controlling for ability using the AFQT. Although AFQT is
not available in the Census/ACS, using this as a covariate helps mitigate omitted variables
bias in ability in the education and earnings relationship. These regressions are reported in
our Appendix Table B.6. After accounting for ability, the NLSY79 suggest a private internal
rate of return to Head Start of 7.7 percent, which ranges from 4 percent for women to 11
73
percent for men. As an alternative, the internal rate of return of putting one child through
Head Start is 2.4 percent using only savings on public assistance expenditures (estimated at
$9,967 in the Survey of Income and Program Participation).
Several reasons suggest that these estimates are conservative. First, our research design
differences out sibling spill-over effects, which tends to reduce the estimated effect sizes.
Second, reports of income and public assistance receipt may be severely underreported in
major national surveys (Meyer, Mok and Sullivan, 2015; Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz,
2001), suggesting estimates of Head Start’s effect on public assistance may be understated.
Third, adding increases in tax revenues and, reductions in deadweight loss from public
assistance transfers, or underreporting in public assistance income would serve to increase
our estimates of the returns to Head Start. Finally, estimates of the returns to Head Start
ignore benefits through improvements in outcomes not measured here. For instance, they
ignore the extent to which more education engenders better health, longevity, or well-being.
These potential limitations, however, tend to strengthen the conclusion that Head Start
achieved its goal of reducing adult poverty, delivering sizable returns to investments made
in the 1960s and 1970s. The results suggest potentially larger social returns.
The long-run returns to today’s public preschool programs may be different for a number
of reasons. Today, the curriculum is different, the target population is different, and the
alternative programs and resources available to poor children are radically different than in
the 1960s. Of course, researchers will need to wait another 50 years to evaluate the long-run
effects of today’s preschool programs. In the meantime, the sizable returns to the “less-than-
model” Head Start preschool program of the 1960s suggest productive avenues for improving
the lot of poor children today.
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Figure 2.2. The Expected Pattern of Effects on Adult Outcomes by Age of Child at Head Start’s
Launch
A. No Sibling Spillovers or Complementarities with Other Programs
B. With Spillovers to Siblings over 6 and Complementarities with Other Programs
Notes: Figure 2.2A illustrates the potential effects of Head Start assuming there are no effects on children
6 and over, no spillovers to older siblings, and no complementarities with other programs. Figure 2.2B
illustrates the way spillovers and complementarities could alter the pattern of the program’s effects.
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Figure 2.3. Funding for Other OEO Programs Relative to the Year Head Start Began
Notes: Dependent variable are binary variables for whether a county received a grant for the indicated
program in the indicated year. Data on federal grants and programs are drawn from the NARA.
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Figure 2.4. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Human Capital
A. Human Capital Index B. High School or More
C. Some College or More D. College or More
E. Years of Schooling F. Professional Job
Notes: The figures plot event-study estimates of φ for different outcomes using the specification in equation
2.1. Standard errors clustered at the county level. Dashed lines show 95-percent, point-wise confidence
intervals for each estimate.
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Figure 2.5. Visual Representation of Test Statistics Evaluation Pre-Trends and Trend Breaks
A. Test for Pre-Trend (slope of spline for age 6-15 at Head Start’s launch)
B. Test for Trend Break (change in spline slope at age 6, before which children
are age-eligible for Head Start)
Notes: The figure plots the t-statistic on the slope of the spline for ages 6-15 (panel A) or the F-statistic for
the test for a trendbreak at age 6 (panel B). Dashed lines show the threshold for statistical significance at
the 10 and 5 percent levels. Compare these to columns 4 and 5 of Tables 2.1 and 2.3.79
Figure 2.6. The Magnitude of Head Start’s Effects on Education Across Studies
A. Effects of Head Start on High School Graduation
B. The Effects of Head Start on College Enrollment
Notes: Circles indicate the reported or derived ATET from different studies. For sibling fixed effect studies,
the ATET is directly reported in the papers. Because we cannot resample from data used in other Head
Start papers, we calculate the ATETs for other papers using a parametric bootstrap procedure using 10,000
independent draws from normal distributions with means and standard deviations equal to the point esti-
mates and standard errors from the reduced-form and first-stage estimates (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).
Because Johnson and Jackson (2017) does not report a standard error on the first stage, the confidence
interval reported for this study in Panel A does not include this first-stage uncertainty. We limited the
y-axis range so that the confidence intervals for most studies could be read from the figure. The confidence
intervals for Ludwig and Miller (2007) fall outside the y-axis range and are [-0.54,1.47] in panel A and [-
0.67,1.82] in panel B. Bars indicate the reported 95-percent confidence interval for sibling fixed-effect models
or constructed for the ITT studies as described in the text. See Appendix for more details on the exact
figures used. *Johnson and Jackson (2017) and Thompson (2017) sample likely eligible samples of the PSID
and NLSY79: individuals born to parents in the bottom quartile of the income distribution, and parents
with no college education, respectively.
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Figure 2.7. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency
A. Economic Self-Sufficiency Index
B. In Poverty
C. In Poverty
Notes: See Figure 2.4 notes. Note that In Poverty and Received Public Assistance are reverse coded when
included in the Economic Self-Sufficiency Index.
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Table 2.1. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Human Capital
Notes: In column 1, the control mean and standard deviation are calculated using the cohorts ages 6 and
7 at the time Head Start was launched. Column 2 presents the estimated intention-to-treat (ITT) effect
evaluated at birth cohort of full exposure (-1, see Figure 2.2). Column 3 presents the ITT spline estimate
evaluated at -1. Column 4 presents the pre-trend estimate for the spline segment for age 6 and older at
implementation. Column 5 presents the F-statistic and p-value for the test of a trend-break in the spline at
age 6. The ATET estimate in column 6 divides the ITT effect at -1 by the estimate of receiving a Head Start
grant on school enrollment at school age 5, 0.149 (s.e. 0.022) for the full sample and 0.151 (s.e. 0.022) for
men and 0.145 (s.e. 0.022) for women; see Appendix Table B.5). Column 7 computes the percentage increase
implied by the ATET relative to the control mean (the ratio of Column 6 to Column 1) for components of
the index. The BH p-values presented in columns 2, 4, and 5 in brackets use the Bonferroni-Holm method
to account for multiple hypotheses testing of individual outcomes within an index.
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Table 2.2. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Human Capital by Sex
Notes: See Table 2.1 notes.
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Table 2.3. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency
Notes: *In poverty and received public program income are reverse-coded when used in the self-sufficiency
index. See also Table 2.1 notes.
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Table 2.4. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency by Sex
Notes: *In poverty and received public program income are reverse-coded when used in the self-sufficiency
index. See also Table 2.1 notes.
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Table 2.5. Heterogeneity in the Effect of Head Start, by Local Programs and Economic Circum-
stances
Notes: ATETs are constructed by dividing the group-specific ITT estimate of Head Start’s effect on long-run
outcomes by the group-specific estimated first stage. Results for the 300 poorest counties are reported in
the column for “above median” with results for other counties reported in “below median.”
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CHAPTER III
Birth Order and Unwanted Fertility
Abstract
An extensive literature documents the effects of birth order on various individual outcomes,
with later-born children faring worse than their siblings. However, the potential mechanisms
behind these effects remain poorly understood. This paper leverages U.S. data on pregnancy
intention to study the role of unwanted fertility in the observed birth order patterns. We
document that children higher in the birth order are much more likely to be unwanted, in
the sense that they were conceived at a time when the family was not planning to have
additional children. Being an unwanted child is associated with negative life-cycle outcomes
as it implies a disruption in parental plans for optimal human capital investment. We show
that the increasing prevalence of unwantedness across birth order explains a substantial part
of the documented birth order effects in education and employment. Consistent with this
mechanism, we document no birth order effects in families who have more control over their
own fertility.
JEL Codes: J13, J22, J24
87
3.1 Introduction
A large literature in psychology and economics documents clear patterns of birth order effects
on various human capital and labor market outcomes. However, little is known about the
potential underlying mechanisms behind these effects. Evidence suggests that later-born
children receive less parental time and investment compared with their earlier-born siblings,
but the sources of these differences remain poorly understood.
This paper contributes to the literature on birth order effects by proposing a novel explana-
tion for a significant part of the observed patterns. It connects the literature on birth order
effects and the literature on the negative impacts of unwanted fertility over the life cycle.1
We show that the observed birth order effects on education and employment may reflect a
disruption in parental plans for optimal investment in their children, as later-born children
are more likely to have been conceived when the family did not want to have an additional
child.
We believe the complementary mechanism we propose to be novel as it provides distinct
testable implication relative to current explanations for observed birth order effects. In
particular, as we discuss below, standard theories predict that birth order effects would
apply to all families irrespective of the pregnancy intention statuses of the various children
in the birth order sequence. Our proposed mechanism implies that the existence or at least
the size of a birth order gradient may depend on the fertility control capabilities of various
families.
It is natural to expect a higher incidence of excess, unwanted children at higher parities.
Few families who are still childless are likely to report that they were not planning to have
children, so very few first-born children are likely to be unwanted. Some families may want
1We follow the demographic definition of an unwanted birth as a birth in excess of total desired fertility.
The broader notion of unintended birth includes both unwanted and mistimed births. Given our purposes,
we do not consider mistimed births.
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to have only one child, so second-born children are more likely to be unwanted. Most families
desire to have only two children, so it is likely that the incidence of unwanted children among
third-borns is much higher.
The very occurrence of an unwanted birth may give rise to birth order differences. While
most families may wish to equalize human capital investments among their children, only
families that succeed in realizing their fertility plans are able to do so. For example, those who
only plan to have two children may make irreversible decisions that might only be consistent
with equalization between the first two (wanted) children. Once a third (unwanted) child is
born, the family’s original investment plan is disrupted and it becomes ex-post suboptimal.
While some re-optimization could occur, particularly by reducing planned investments or
disinvesting in first- and second-born children, it might be very costly or impossible at that
point to re-optimize in a way that achieves perfect equalization among all three siblings. This
friction could give rise to the birth order effects we see in the data. There might be rigidities
to disinvesting in existing siblings and those disinvestments might be necessary to reach
perfect equalization. Moreover, the rigidity might be larger for the oldest, first-born sibling,
since more time has passed and more investments have been embodied and crystalized in
that child.
According to this story, if parents have made commitments that are difficult to revise upon
the birth of an unwanted child, then the unwanted, higher birth order child will tend to
receive less investment relative to earlier born siblings, generating a gap that contributes to
the birth order effects. For example, parents may have made location, labor supply, housing,
consumption, borrowing, and investment decisions that would have been different had they
known an additional child would be eventually born. As a result, higher order, unanticipated
children may tend to do worse in terms of human capital and labor market outcomes, and
this could contribute to the birth order gradient. A corollary is that birth order effects would
tend to be ameliorated in families that for various reasons have more control over their own
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fertility.
In this paper, we first replicate earlier findings of birth order effects using both OLS and
family fixed effects specifications. Next, we show that these effects vanish once we focus on a
subsample of families who intended to have all the children they had. We then show that the
incidence of unwanted births increases significantly with birth order, and that accounting
for this pattern of unwantedness flattens the birth order gradient. We also show that our
birth order results are robust to alternative mechanisms, such as exposure to changes in
family structure or last-born effects arising from endogenous fertility stopping rules. When
we investigate subgroups, we find that birth order effects no longer arise when we restrict
our focus to families that presumably have (for religious reasons) more control over their
fertility.
The data requirements to accomplish this study are somewhat demanding. We rely on
longitudinal microdata from the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The PSID data allow
us to observe the adult outcomes of multiple siblings within a family along with their birth
order. Of more novelty and critical for our purposes, the PSID data includes a retrospective
maternal assessment about her pregnancy intention status at the time each of these siblings
were conceived. We argue this information is particularly valuable for any study that aims
to understand the role of birth order. Without it, one might be missing a significant element
of parental decision-making.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the two unrelated
literatures that converge in this paper. In Section 3.3, we describe the PSID data we use
in this paper. Section 3.4 presents our empirical methods and main findings. Section 3.5
provides concluding remarks.
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3.2 Related Literature
In the two subsections below, we provide a brief overview of relevant previous work in the
two strands of literature that have so far developed independently of each other. First, we
summarize a large literature that documents and attempts to explain birth order effects in
various outcomes. Second, we summarize a smaller literature that explores the association
between maternal pregnancy intention and individual outcomes later in life. To our knowl-
edge, there is no previous work connecting these two literatures explicitly as we propose in
this article.
3.2.1 Birth Order
A vast literature in economics explores birth order effects in various outcomes over the life
cycle. Much of the literature focuses on completed education as the outcome of interest, and
uses data from developed countries finding large and significant negative effects associated
with a higher birth order.2 The earliest work on birth order we are aware of in the economics
literature goes back to Lindert (1977). He pointed out the importance of exploiting within
family variation to ensure that no unobserved family characteristics confound the birth order
patterns. He suggested that the family’s time budget gets diluted across various siblings and
this process tends to benefit earlier-born siblings. A modern testing of this hypothesis can
be found in the influential work by Price (2008). Also seminal to this literature was work
by Behrman and Taubman (1986), who explored birth order effects within the theoretical
framework of Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982).3
The literature was re-invigorated in the 2000s with the work of Black, Devereux and Sal-
2The birth order literature is more limited in developing countries so little is known about how these
patterns generalize to that context. For a few exceptions, see Birdsall (1979), Birdsall (1990), Behrman
(1988), Horton (1988), Ejrnæs and Po¨rtner (2004), Edmonds (2006) and De Haan, Plug and Rosero (2014)
3See Kessler (1991) for additional early references.
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vanes (2005), who documented convincing birth order effects using a large dataset from
Norway and spurred a large and still active literature in economics. Subsequent work has
documented birth order effects on various outcomes, primarily focusing on school attain-
ment and performance (Kantarevic and Mechoulan (2006), Booth and Kee (2009), De Haan
(2010), Bagger et al. (2013), Hotz and Pantano (2015)), measures of cognitive ability (Conley
and Glauber (2006), Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2011), Lehmann, Nuevo-Chiquero and
Vidal-Fernandez (2013), Hotz and Pantano (2015), Pavan (2016)), but also exploring risky
behaviors (Argys et al. (2006), Hao, Hotz and Jin (2008), Averett, Argys and Rees (2011)),
health (Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2016), Bjo¨rkegren and Svaleryd (2017), Brenøe and
Molitor (2018)) and delinquency (Breining et al. (2017)).
Much of the recent literature has tried to uncover and elucidate various alternative mecha-
nisms giving rise to observed birth order effects that go beyond the above-mentioned “time
dilution” theory. These hypotheses range from differential parenting strategies (Hao, Hotz
and Jin (2008), Averett, Argys and Rees (2011), Hotz and Pantano (2015)) to parental trans-
fer behavior (De Haan (2010), Mechoulan and Wolff (2015)), direct parental preferences for
birth order (Bagger et al. (2013)) and early parental investments (Lehmann, Nuevo-Chiquero
and Vidal-Fernandez (2013), Pavan (2016)). Birth order effects have of course been studied
in other disciplines, primarily in psychology. Early work by Belmont and Marolla (1973)
provided some of the more convincing empirical evidence that spurred most of the modern
research on birth order in recent decades, but some of these arguments go back to Gal-
ton (1875). Sulloway (2010) and Eckstein et al. (2010) provide surveys of the literature in
psychology which focus more on how personality and non-cognitive skills vary with birth
order. This is an important outcome that economists are beginning to tackle as well (Black,
Gro¨nqvist and O¨ckert (2017)).
Overall, this literature has provided substantial evidence that earlier-born siblings tend to
have higher cognitive skills and very different personality traits, go on to complete higher
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levels of schooling, engage less frequently in risky behaviors, earn higher wages, and display
a variety of positive outcomes along various dimensions later in life.
3.2.2 Unwanted Fertility and its Effects
The standard model of completed fertility and child quality in economics (Becker and Lewis
(1973), Willis (1973) and much of the large literature that followed these seminal contri-
butions) assumes that fertility is a perfectly controlled process, so unwanted births are not
defined in that setting. Yet a growing literature, primarily in demography, has documented
the prevalence of unwanted pregnancies and the life-cycle consequences associated with be-
ing the result of an unwanted pregnancy.4 Michael and Willis (1976) extended these early
economic models to incorporate imperfect fertility control and a distinction between desired
and realized births. Economists have also recognized early on the importance of allowing for
the effects of a dynamically changing, uncertain environment in the econometric modeling
of reproductive decisions (see, for example, Barmby and Cigno (1990)).
Economists have also begun to investigate these issues empirically by exploiting direct ma-
ternal assessments of pregnancy intention (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Joyce, Kaestner
and Korenman (2000), Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman (2002), Miller (2009), Lin and Pan-
tano (2015), Lin et al. (2017)). Others have exploited natural experiments or reproductive
policy changes that allow comparison of individuals from otherwise similar cohorts that were
born at times when mothers had greatly different opportunities to control their own fertil-
ity (Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999), Donohue and Levitt (2001), Charles and Stephens
(2006), Pop-Eleches (2006), Donohue, Grogger and Levitt (2009), Ananat and Hungerman
(2012), Ozbeklik (2014)) or at times that are thought to be auspicious for birth (Do and
Phung (2010)). The balance of the literature indicates that unwanted children tend to do
worse along many dimensions of adult life (education, employment, health, crime, etc.)
4See among others Baydar (1995), Kubicˇka et al. (1995), Myhrman et al. (1995).
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3.3 The Data
Our primary source of data is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal
survey of a nationally representative sample of US individuals and families with ongoing data
collection since 1968. The PSID continuously collects information on individual longitudinal
outcomes for its initial survey respondents and their descendants. We can observe individuals
and their siblings. This allows us to study the effects of birth order on outcomes later in
life (e.g., completed education, employment) by comparing children of different birth order
within the same families.
We construct our sample of children from the Childbirth and Adoption History File. The
file contains records of childbirths and adoptions of individuals living in a PSID family at
the time of the interview in any wave from 1985 through 2013. We restrict our sample
to childbirth events reported by mothers and drop multiple births. We then obtain details
about each child, including year of birth and birth order, as well as details about the mothers,
such as their age at the time of birth, total number of births, and year of the most recent
maternal report. We only include in our sample the children with mothers whose most recent
report happens after she turns 35, so her total number of births is unlikely to change in the
future.
Using the unique identifiers in the PSID, we combine the childbirth information with other
PSID files at the individual and family levels to construct our set of control variables and to
add key pieces of information for our study. First, we construct completed years of education
for our sample of children. Using the PSID cross-year individual file, we only collect years
of education after age 24, or when the same individual’s highest years of education appear
in two or more waves and consistent with the latest record, so the process of human capital
accumulation is most likely to have completed. We also construct a measure of employment
in adulthood. The employment variable is constructed by reverse-coding an indicator of
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whether the individual was unemployed at any time in 2011 and restricted to individuals
who were between the ages of 24 and 50.5
We also obtain valuable information on pregnancy intention reported by the mothers of
our sample children in the PSID. In the 1985 interview, the PSID included a questionnaire
for wives and long-term female cohabiters, allowing these women to answer for themselves
some questions about their fertility history. Included in the set of questions unique to the
1985 interview is a retrospective pregnancy intention assessment. We use these pregnancy
intention reports to construct our indicator defining a child as unwanted. Specifically, we
define a child as unwanted if the mother reported that she was not planning to have any
(more) children when she became pregnant with that child. This means that neither the
children whose mother reported them as “mistimed” nor those reported as “wanted” will
be considered unwanted. In particular, mistimed children who were conceived “too soon,”
while still the result of unintended pregnancies, are not considered unwanted according to
our definition. Parents had a plan to eventually have this child, and their decision making
was conditional on that plan.6
Our analysis is limited by the fact that pregnancy intention questions were only fielded in the
1985 survey. We are therefore unable to evaluate pregnancy intention status for individuals
born after 1985. However, this limitation is not significantly stricter than the requirement for
our sample children to have completed their education by 2013. It is also worth noting that
the mothers were only asked to report pregnancy intention associated with the conception
of their first, last, and second to last child, which means we can only observe the complete
pattern of pregnancy intentions for families with no more than three children. This limits
our ability to look at larger families. Still, the available data allow us to examine birth order
effects in families with two or three children. This will be sufficient to convey our main
5The indicator is not defined for those who reported being out of labor force for the entire year.
6Children who result from mistimed pregnancies, particularly when these occur before marriage, may also
have negative effects on outcomes later in life. See, for example, Nguyen (2018)
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findings.
The use of retrospective assessments of pregnancy intention is controversial, as many (see,
for example, Westoff and Ryder (1977) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)) fear that these
reports could be contaminated by ex-post rationalization and other selective recall prob-
lems. However, work by Schoen et al. (1999) and Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman (2002)
specifically addresses these questions and suggests that these retrospective reports about
pregnancy intention tend to be valid.7 We present summary statistics for our analysis sam-
ple in Table 3.1.
As can be seen in the table, our sample comes from families with two or three children so
the incidence of third-born children in the sample is smaller than that of either first-born or
second-born children.8 The average number of years of completed education in the sample is
about 14. The sample is primarily composed of white and black children with a small number
of Hispanics and children of other races. The average age of the children in our sample is 40
as of 2013. By 2013, the children in our sample have all grown up and are all well into their
adult years. About 16 percent of these children are unwanted as defined above. However, as
we will now show, this masks substantial variation across birth order.
The pattern of unwantedness by birth order for subsamples of children from families with two
or three children is presented in Table 3.2. In families with two children, 11% of first-borns
are unwanted. The rate of unwantedness increases to 15% for second-born children.
Families with three children show the same pattern of increasing prevalence of unwanted
7Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman (2002) find that prospective and retrospective reports of pregnancy
intention provide the same estimate of the effects of being an unintended child on various prenatal outcomes
once they control for selective pregnancy recognition using an IV procedure. Further, they show that the
extent of unwanted fertility was the same regardless of whether the assessment was during pregnancy or
after birth. They show this for a subsample of women for whom pregnancy intention was assessed both
prospectively (during pregnancy) and retrospectively (after birth).
8In principle, since we are looking at families with two and three children, the number of first-born
and second-born children should be the same. In practice however, our number of second-born children is
slightly smaller than the number of first-borns because they are more likely to have missing information on
our outcome of interest, completed education.
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pregnancy with birth order. Notably though, 37% of third-born children are reported as
unwanted by their mothers, a substantial increase relative to first and second birth order.
As discussed earlier, we are unable to document unwantedness status for all children in
families of more than three children. In addition, a much smaller number of families in PSID
has four or more children. For these two reasons, we limit our analysis to families with two
or three children. 9
It is of interest to explore whether the pattern we identify for our PSID children born before
1985 holds also for more recent cohorts. Families who had all of their children more recently
may have been in better position to plan their fertility and not exceed their desired family
size. To explore this, we rely on data from various recent waves of the National Survey of
Family Growth (NSFG) as reported in Child Trends (2013). The NSFG is a repeated cross-
sectional survey and, as such, cannot be used to explore birth order effects in adult outcomes
like completed schooling. However, the NSFG includes a valuable retrospective assessment
of a woman’s fertility history that can be used to explore how pregnancy intention varies
with birth order. Table 3.3 combines information from our PSID sample with reports based
on the NSFG.
As can be seen in the table, there is still a substantial increase in the prevalence of unwant-
edness as we move across the birth order in more recent years, particularly for those who are
third-born or have an even higher birth order. The incidence of unwanted children among
third-borns is somewhat smaller in the more recent cohorts that can be reported about in
the NSFG waves. This is because our PSID sample of children draws from earlier cohorts
where the opportunities to prevent unwanted births were more limited. In particular, at
the time in which many of the children in these earlier cohorts were conceived, abortion
9However, it is of interest to explore whether the pattern of increasing prevalence of unwanted children
across birth order holds in 4-child families. Since we only know whether the first, last, or second to last child
in a family was unwanted, we cannot tell whether a second-born child in a four-child family was unwanted.
But we can still look at first-, third-, and fourth-born children in those families. Consistent with the patterns
in Table 3.2, we find that in four-child families, the incidence of unwanted children grows from 16% among
first-borns, to 27% among third-borns to a whopping 53% among fourth-borns.
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was not yet legal, and oral contraceptives were not yet widely available. Lin and Pantano
(2015) document a decrease in the prevalence of unintended births following legalization of
abortion. Bailey (2010) points out the large increase in the share of families with fewer than
three children following the “contraceptive revolution” of the 1960s. Presumably much of
that change was accomplished by the avoidance of what would have otherwise been unwanted
third-born children. However, as the NSFG numbers show, while in the more recent years
the opportunities to prevent or terminate unwanted pregnancies are more widely available,
it remains the case that the prevalence of unwanted births increases with birth order and it
is particularly high for third- and higher-born children.
3.4 Methods and Results
To examine the relationship between birth order and completed years of schooling, we con-
sider the following model in the same mold as Kantarevic and Mechoulan (2006) and others
in the birth order literature:
Yih = α1 + α21 [BOih = 2] + α31 [BOih = 3] + βXih + εi (3.1)
where Yih denotes completed years of education of child i in family h,1 [BOih = k] is an
indicator variable that equals 1 whenever child i has the kth birth order in family h. Xih
is a vector of control variables that accounts for observed characteristics of child i and/or
family h. Note that first-borns correspond to the omitted category.
We begin by replicating the results reported in Kantarevic and Mechoulan (2006), who also
use the PSID data. Table 3.4 presents our results. We are successful at replicating their
main findings. The results are presented along six columns.
The first three specifications do not include controls for Xhi, whereas the last three do. In
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both cases, the first specification, in columns (1) and (4), pools families with 2 and 3 children
(controlling for family size) and the following two specifications consider models separately
for a subsample of families with 2 children and a subsample of families with 3 children.
Standard errors are clustered at the family level in all of our specifications.
As can be seen in column 1, in the simplest specification without controls, second- and third-
born children tend to complete 0.09 and 0.25 fewer years of education, respectively. Once
we control for the child’s sex and race as well as family size and maternal characteristics
such as mother’s age at birth and mother’s education, we find that the birth order effects are
accentuated. The negative coefficients on the indicators for second and third born children
are now larger in magnitude (−0.31 and −0.44) and more statistically significant. Estimates
for control variables in columns 4–6 have the expected sign: males and children in black
families tend to have completed less schooling. Family size has overall a negative and sta-
tistically significant effect, with those growing up in families with three children having on
average 0.20 fewer years of schooling than those in 2-child families. Controlling for family
size is particularly important when pooling children from families of different sizes because,
by construction, a higher birth order is only feasible in larger families.
While some observed characteristics of the mother and the family can be controlled for, it
is always possible that there are additional unobservable characteristics that could confound
the effects of birth order. To tackle this issue, we exploit information on siblings of different
birth order within the same families. To do so we follow Kantarevic and Mechoulan (2006)
and explore a family fixed effects specification:
Yih = α1 + α21 [BOih = 2] + α31 [BOih = 3] + βXi + λh + εih (3.2)
where the only differences with respect to the model in (3.1) is that Xi now is a vector of
control variables that only accounts for observed characteristics of child i within a family
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h as the family characteristics, both observed and unobserved are absorbed into the family
fixed effect λh. Results of estimating the model in (3.2) are presented in Table 3.5.
They show that the birth order patterns are robust to controlling for family characteristics
that are common across siblings within a given family. Controlling for family fixed effects
and thus using only within family variation produces estimated birth order effects that
remain sizable and significant, especially among three-child families. In particular, the pooled
specification still shows significant reductions of 0.24 and 0.39 years of schooling for second-
and third-born children relative to their own first-born siblings.
3.4.1 Imperfect Fertility Control
Our main hypothesis is that families who have the ability to perfectly control their fertility
are better able to equalize outcomes among their offspring. We conjecture that families
with more imperfect fertility control are less likely to accomplish such equalization. This
could be because unwanted children in excess of the family’s target level of desired fertility
are not “budgeted for” in the family’s investment plan. It is possible for the family to re-
optimize upon the birth of an unwanted child by re-allocating resources from elder siblings
to the new unwanted child. But such re-allocations are unlikely to accomplish a perfect
equalization.
To investigate this possibility, we next explore how results in Table 3.5 change when we focus
on families for which there is evidence of perfect fertility control and families for which there
is not. To implement this, we create an indicator Unwantedhi which equals one whenever
child i in family h was the result of a pregnancy that was retrospectively assessed as unwanted
by the mother. A child is defined as unwanted in the sense described in Section 3.3. We then
define Wh = 1 if all children in family h are reported as wanted, and we set Wh = 0 otherwise.
Panels A and B of Table 3.6 present the results in the two subsamples (Wh = 1 and Wh = 0).
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We first re-estimate the family fixed effects specification in (3.2) for a subsample of families
where all children are reported as wanted (Wh = 1). These are families who planned to have
all of the children they ended up having, and therefore faced no disruption in their optimal
child investment allocation process. These families represent 50% of all the families whose
children we use in the full sample. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows the results.
As can be seen in the table, the birth order effects we documented in Table 3.5 essentially
disappear. The coefficients on second- and third-born children are now much smaller and, in
some cases, even positive for these families who had no unwanted children. Moreover, none
of the birth order effects in panel A are statistically significant.
On the other hand, panel B of Table 3.6 shows that families without evidence of perfect
fertility control (Wh = 0) retain sizable and significant birth order effects.
10
Panel C presents tests of statistical significance for the differences between panels A and B.
In the pooled specification, the differences are statistically significant at 1% for the second
child and 5% for the third child. The differences for the second child are also significant even
in the smaller subsamples of 2- and 3-children families. These substantial differences provide
our first line of evidence showing that birth order effects are somehow linked to families’
fertility control.
While the differences in the birth order gradient are striking, we exercise caution when
interpreting these results. It is possible that unobserved family heterogeneity could be driving
our findings. That would be the case if some family unobservable is correlated with both,
imperfect fertility control and the existence of birth order effects. Families who are good at
avoiding unwanted births are different (in observed and likely unobserved ways) from other
families who are less successful regarding fertility planning. Therefore, we do not claim to
attach a causal interpretation to these results. For example, it could be that families good
10These are families for which we identify at least one unwanted child or families for which information
for pregnancy status is missing for at least one child.
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at contracepting are particularly averse to inequality in outcomes and thus try harder to
avoid a large birth order gradient among their offspring. If that is the case, one would see
more inequality in outcomes among the children of families who contracept poorly. This
is something to bear in mind as the family fixed effects in our child level models do not
necessarily account for this problem.
3.4.2 Accounting for Pregnancy Intention in Estimation of Birth Order Ef-
fects
The family fixed effects specification has become standard when looking at birth order effects,
but it only controls for unobserved factors that are common across siblings within a family.
We have already controlled for maternal age at birth, but there might be other characteristics
that are typically unobserved, vary across siblings, and are correlated with both birth order
and later life outcomes like completed years of schooling. One such factor we do get to
observe is the pregnancy intention status corresponding to the conception of each child in
the family. As documented in Section 3.3, higher birth order children are more likely to be
the result of an unwanted pregnancy. Given the large differences observed in panels A and B
of Table 3.6, it is natural to explore how birth order effects change once we account for this
child-specific factor, often unobserved in various datasets that are used to document birth
order effects.
Before exploring how accounting for pregnancy intention affects birth order effects on com-
pleted education in the full sample, we provide a more systematic examination of how the
chance of being unwanted rises with birth order. While the results in Table 3.2 are quite
suggestive, we first investigate whether those results are robust to controlling for the same
set of observable characteristics X. To do so, we re-estimate the model in (3.1) using our
indicator that denotes whether the individual was the result of an unwanted pregnancy as
dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 3.7.
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As we can see, the pattern of increasing unwantedness as we move higher in the birth order
is robust to controlling for observable characteristics. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 3.8,
the results are robust to further controlling for family fixed effects, particularly for third-born
children.
Having established a clear pattern of increasing prevalence of unwanted children higher on
the birth sequence, we explore the implications of pregnancy intention across birth order
for the estimation of birth order effects in education. To that end, we include our key
measure characterizing each child within a family as wanted or unwanted in our models
for completed education. Our objective is to explore if and how the pattern of birth order
effects on education changes once we control for the maternal pregnancy intention indicators
corresponding to each child. Table 3.9 presents results from family fixed effects specifications
that add the child-level Unwantedhi indicator to the model in (3.2).
The results show that the birth order gradient becomes less pronounced once we account
for indicators characterizing maternal pregnancy intention at the time these children were
conceived.
For example, in the pooled specification in column 1, the effects for second- and third-born
children change from −0.24 and −0.39 in Table 3.5 to −0.14 and −0.23 in Table 3.9, both
large percent-wise reductions in magnitude. Moreover, using a 1000-resamplings bootstrap,
we found that the birth order effect differences in the pooled sample of two- and three-child
families across Tables 3.5 and 3.9 are both statistically significant at the 10% level. Further,
we now see that only higher birth order children in three-child families have a significantly
negative effect, but the magnitudes (−0.25 for second-born and −0.37 for third-born) are
much smaller than those in Table 3.5 (−0.30 for second-born and −0.50 for third-born).
Indeed, for third-born children in three-child families, the difference across tables is, again,
statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Our focus here is not to estimate the impact of being an unwanted child, but rather account
for differential pregnancy intention rates across birth order in the estimation of birth order
effects. Further, we aim to explore how different the birth order gradient is across families
with and without imperfect fertility control. However, it is worth noting that the Unwantedhi
indicator is not statistically different from zero in the family fixed effect specifications of
Table 3.9. This is consistent with work by Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman (2000) who find
similar results using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, albeit looking at outcomes
earlier in life. This is not surprising because, as pointed out by Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1993), the family fixed effects specification will tend to provide a biased estimate of the
effects of being unwanted. This is because the birth of an unwanted child will likely have an
effect on existing siblings as parents re-optimize (i.e., reduce) their allocations toward those
siblings as they cope with the arrival of the unwanted child. While our main approach takes
as given the idea that unwanted children do worse, neither our OLS (because of omitted
variable bias) nor our family fixed effect (because of spillover on existing siblings) strategies
are well suited to test that hypothesis in a causal sense. The true effect is probably somewhere
in between.
Taken together, the attenuation of the birth order gradient once we account for unwanted
births, coupled with the absence of birth order effects in families where all children are
wanted, suggests that pregnancy intention might be an important consideration when as-
sessing the effects of birth order on various outcomes.
3.4.3 Birth Order Effect Heterogeneity in Groups with More or Less Imperfect
Fertility Control
In this subsection, we explore how birth order effects vary among groups with differential
fertility control. We follow Lin and Pantano (2015) and use information on maternal religion
to classify our children into two groups. First, we create a group whose mothers report a
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religion affiliation that tends to be more strongly against the use of abortion. We denote this
as the “pro-life” subsample. We group a second set of children whose mothers report either
no religion affiliation or an affiliation that has less stringent attitudes towards abortion. We
denote this as the “pro-choice” subsample. We use the same criteria as in Lin and Pantano
(2015) to classify these religions into this binary indicator of attitudes toward abortion.11 To
be sure, within each religion, there will be those who adhere more strictly to their religion’s
stance and those who will align less strongly. The indicator is not meant to classify the
exact attitude of a particular mother, but rather provide an indicator of her likely ability
to terminate unwanted pregnancies. We expect the birth order effects to be stronger in
the “pro-life” sub-sample as mothers in this sub-sample are less likely to use abortion to
terminate unwanted pregnancies.
On the other hand, we expect the birth order effects to be milder in the “pro-choice” sub-
sample as these families are more likely to use abortion to prevent unwanted births. As a
result, the prevalence of unwanted third-born children, relative to first-born children may not
be as high for these “pro-choice” families. We re-estimate the family fixed effects specification
in (3.2) in the sub-samples of children grouped according to these different maternal religious
affiliations. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present the results.
The birth order effects are quite strong in the “pro-life” subsample. Indeed, they are as
strong as those reported in Table 3.5. For example, in the pooled specification, on average,
second- and third-born siblings complete 0.26 and 0.40 fewer years of education than their
first-born sibling within the same family.
On the other hand, there are no apparent birth order effects in the “pro-choice” subsample
11We follow the religion taxonomy in Evans (2002) and classify the following religions as having a more
strict attitude against abortion: Roman Catholic, Protestant, other Protestant, other Non-Christian, Latter
Day Saints, Mormon, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Greek/Russian/Eastern Orthodox, Lutheran, Christian, Chris-
tian Science, Seventh Day Adventist, Pentecostal, Jewish, Amish, and Mennonite. Mothers reporting these
religions are more likely to be pro-life and less likely to use abortion to terminate unwanted pregnancies. We
then classify Baptists, Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Unitarians along with Agnostics and
Atheists as having a less strict attitude towards abortion.
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as reported in Table 3.11. As can be seen in this table, while the point estimates are still
mostly negative, all of them are smaller in magnitude and none of them is statistically
significant. However, while the differences in the birth order estimates across the two groups
are sizable, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the effects in Tables 3.10 and 3.11
are the same.
3.4.4 Alternative Mechanisms
We have found compelling evidence of the important role played by pregnancy intention in
generating birth order effects. We now test two alternative mechanisms that could give rise
to birth order effects in our sample.
First, it has been documented that family structure may affect children’s education outcomes
(Ermisch and Francesconi (2001)). Then, it is possible that children higher in the birth
sequence could be more affected by changes in family structure relative to earlier-born siblings
and this could affect their educational achievement. As a result, it has become standard in
the literature to test whether birth order effects hold in a subsample of intact families (see,
for example, Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005), Hotz and Pantano (2015)). Second, it is
possible that endogenous fertility-stopping rules could be the reason behind our birth order
effects. We show that the birth order effects we identify in this sample are robust to these
two possibilities. To test whether our results in Table 3.5 reflect just differential exposure to
changes in family structure, we re-estimate our main fixed effects specification in (3.2) but
in a subsample of intact families.
To construct our subsample of intact families, we link our data with the PSID Marriage
History File, which contains information on the mothers’ marriage events collected retro-
spectively in the 1985 through 2013 waves. We use this data to create a sample of intact
families within our main sample by keeping a family only when the mother’s first mar-
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riage stayed intact by the year her last child turned 24, and when the mother’s most recent
marriage report was collected after her last child turned 24.
By applying these sample restrictions, we focus on a subsample of individuals whose fam-
ily structure was relatively stable through the completion of their education. Results are
presented in Table 3.12.
As we can see in the table, sizable birth order effects are still present in this subsample, and
remain statistically significant despite the smaller sample size. This suggest that the birth
order effects we find are not driven by differential exposure to disruptions in family structure.
Later-born siblings have lower educational attainment for reasons other than their higher
likelihood of growing up in a broken home.
Next, we investigate whether the birth order effects we document are driven by endogenous
fertility stoppage. When a newborn child is particularly unhealthy, it is possible that parents
may not have additional children, to ensure they have the time and resources to care for the
unhealthy child. If this is the case, the last born would tend to be particularly unhealthy
and this could affect cognitive development and, ultimately, educational attainment. Note
that later-born siblings tend to engage more in risky behaviors in their late teen and early
twenties and this could lead to reduced health in adulthood, but would not necessarily
provide evidence consistent with the rationale behind an endogenous fertility rule. Still, in
our preliminary explorations, we found no birth order effects in measures of adult health.
To investigate this further, we deemed more appropriate to use a measure of health earlier
in life. We re-estimated our main fixed effects specification in (3.2) but using as dependent
variable a measure of health during childhood and adolescence.
This presents a challenge as the individuals in our sample grew up during years in which
the PSID was not yet systematically collecting information on health. Fortunately, in more
recent years, PSID asked heads of households and wives to provide a summary retrospective
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assessment about their own health status earlier in their lives (health status before they
turned 17 years old). This measure could be more plausibly related to the type of health
issues that could lead an individual’s parents to stop their fertility. Results are presented in
Table 3.13. As can be seen in this table, we find no significant birth order effects in health
status during childhood and adolescence. These findings ameliorate concerns that our results
could be driven by endogenous last-born effects.
3.4.5 Employment Outcomes
In this subsection we explore how birth order is associated with adult employment and
whether pregnancy intention plays a similar role. The construction of our measure of em-
ployment in adulthood is described in Section 3.3. Our findings are broadly similar to the
reported effects on completed education.
Tables C.1-C.7 in the Appendix present the results. Table C.1 presents the basic OLS
estimates and Table C.2 reports the basic family fixed effects estimates. These tables show
that there is a reduction in the probability of adult employment for second- and third-born
children relative to first-born children. In the family fixed effects specification, the decline
in employment is particularly strong and statistically significant for later-born siblings in
three-child families, with declines of 9 and 13 percentage points. Tables C.3 and C.4 show
that, again, the effects are very different in families with and without evidence of perfect
fertility control.12 Also, once we control for pregnancy intention status as in Table C.5, the
birth order gradient in employment is attenuated relative to that in Table C.2. Further, in
line with our education findings, column (3) in Tables C.6 and C.7 show that the reported
decline in employment is statistically significant in the pro-life sample but not in the pro-
choice sample.
12In the pooled specification, the effects for the third child are statistically significantly different from each
other across the two tables.
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3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we connect two disjoint literatures to shed more light on a novel mechanism
that can give rise to birth order effects. The sources of birth order effects have puzzled
economists and social scientists for decades. We document that, as one might expect, the
prevalence of unwanted children increases with birth order, particularly when moving from
second- to third-born children. We then replicate earlier findings related to birth order effects
on completed education for the United States using data from PSID and a research design
that exploits within-family variation. We go on to show that these birth order effects are
reduced once we account for the differential pregnancy intention status of children born into
different birth order. Moreover, we show that birth order effects no longer arise once we focus
on a subsample of children from families who had no unwanted children or on families with
religion background with less stringent attitudes towards the use of abortion. We conclude
that the increasing prevalence of unwanted children at higher parities could be an important
mechanism behind the well-documented birth order effects.
We show that our results are robust to alternative hypotheses that have been proposed in the
literature on birth order effects. In particular, we show that our results hold in intact families
and that they are not likely the result of endogenous last-born effects arising from fertility
stopping after the birth of an unhealthy child. We also investigate adult employment and
find similar patterns of attenuation of negative birth order effects once we factor in pregnancy
intention.
It is possible that families might be averse to inequality in outcomes among their offspring,
and they may try to equalize these outcomes as a result. Yet, families that avoid unwanted
births and do not exceed their target desired fertility seem to be in better position to equalize
outcomes among their offspring. While further research is necessary to directly test this
mechanism, our findings are consistent with it.
109
Taken together, our results suggest novel avenues for future research on birth order effects.
It would be interesting to see whether birth order effects are stronger in countries with
more imperfect fertility control. Similarly, it might be interesting to explore whether, within
countries, birth order effects are stronger during periods where the ability to avoid unwanted
births is more limited. By the same token, one would expect birth order effects to be more
pronounced, everything else equal, among groups that for cultural reasons are less prone to
utilize various forms of fertility control.
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
3-Child Family 0.52 0.50 0 1
First-Born 0.46 0.50 0 1
Second-Born 0.39 0.49 0 1
Third-Born 0.15 0.36 0 1
Unwanted 0.16 0.36 0 1
Completed Years of Education 13.71 2.15 1 17
Employed in 2011 0.86 0.34 0 1
Self Reported Good Health before 17 0.83 0.37 0 1
Male 0.51 0.50 0 1
Age 40.24 12.34 18 93
Mother’s Age at Childbirth 24.78 5.23 13 48
Mother’s Education in 1985 12.49 2.45 5 18
White 0.44 0.50 0 1
Black 0.19 0.39 0 1
Hispanic 0.02 0.14 0 1
Other Race 0.35 0.48 0 1
Observations 5499
Notes: Sample includes children from families with 2 or 3 children, with non-missing values of the outcome
variable. For some variables like mother’s education and the indicator for pregnancy intention associated
with each child, the effective sample size is smaller as observations with missing values are excluded from
the summary statistics. Mother’s education is collected as of 1985, the year in which the retrospective
pregnancy history was collected.
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Table 3.2. Patterns of Unwanted Fertility by Birth Order
(1) (2)
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 1 0.11 0.13
[0.09,0.12] [0.11,0.15]
Birth Order = 2 0.15 0.16
[0.13,0.17] [0.14,0.19]
Birth Order = 3 0.37
[0.33,0.40]
Observations 2361 2524
Notes: 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Sample: PSID children from families with two or three
children whose maternal pregnancy intention status at conception is not missing.
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Table 3.3. Percentage of Unwanted Children by Birth Order PSID and NSFG
1985 2002 2006-10
Birth Order = 1 11.8 8.5 8.8
Birth Order = 2 15.6 11.3 11.3
Birth Order ≥ 3 36.6 26.6 23.0
Source PSID NSFG NSFG
Notes: The table reports the percentage of children who are retrospectively assessed as unwanted by their
mothers at the time of interview. A child is defined as unwanted if the mother reports that when the child
was conceived, she was not planning to have any (more) children. Neither at that time, nor in the future.
The retrospective information collected in 1985 is based on the 1985 PSID wave and its Childbirth and
Adoption History File. The 1985 sample is limited to families with two or three children. It does not
include one-child families, or any birth order higher than three. The information based on retrospective
information collected in 2002 and 2006-2010 comes from a Child Trends (2013) report based on
corresponding waves from the National Survey of Family Growth.
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Table 3.5. Birth Order and Education - Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.24∗∗∗ -0.16 -0.30∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10)
Birth Order = 3 -0.39∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18)
Male -0.52∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Constant 12.42∗∗∗ 14.00∗∗∗ 11.55∗∗∗
(1.29) (1.69) (1.77)
Observations 5499 2652 2847
Mean Dependent Variable 13.71 13.92 13.50
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Covariates include maternal age at childbirth and dummy
variables indicating various age categories. Dependent variable measures completed years of education.
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Table 3.6. Birth Order and Education in Families with and without Perfect Fertility Control -
Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Panel A: Families with Evidence of Perfect Fertility Control
Birth Order = 2 0.06 0.11 -0.03
(0.14) (0.20) (0.19)
Birth Order = 3 -0.02 -0.10
(0.25) (0.32)
Observations 1904 1139 765
Mean Dependent Variable 14.25 14.39 14.04
Panel B: Families without Evidence of Perfect Fertility Control
Birth Order = 2 -0.46∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.16) (0.13)
Birth Order = 3 -0.64∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.22)
Observations 3595 1513 2082
Mean Dependent Variable 13.42 13.57 13.31
Panel C: Panel B minus A Differences [p-value]
Birth Order = 2 -0.52∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗ -0.40∗
[0.002] [0.027] [0.078]
Birth Order = 3 -0.63∗∗ -0.61
[0.044] [0.114]
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Covariates include maternal age at childbirth and dummy
variables indicating various age categories. Dependent variable measures completed years of education.
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Table 3.8. Birth Order and the Probability of Being Unwanted - Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Birth Order = 3 0.24∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Male -0.00 -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.84∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.31) (0.36)
Observations 4885 2361 2524
Mean Dependent Variable 0.17 0.13 0.21
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Covariates include maternal age at childbirth and dummy
variables indicating various age categories. Dependent variable equals 1 if individual is the result of an
unwanted pregnancy, zero otherwise.
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Table 3.9. Birth Order and Education Accounting for Unwantedness - Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.14 -0.01 -0.25∗∗
(0.09) (0.14) (0.12)
Birth Order = 3 -0.23 -0.37∗
(0.16) (0.19)
Unwanted 0.05 -0.01 0.06
(0.13) (0.22) (0.16)
Male -0.53∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Constant 12.33∗∗∗ 13.96∗∗∗ 11.45∗∗∗
(1.30) (1.71) (1.79)
Observations 5499 2652 2847
Mean Dependent Variable 13.71 13.92 13.50
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Covariates include maternal age at childbirth and dummy
variables indicating various age categories. For children with missing information on their maternal
pregnancy status at conception we include an indicator which equals to one whenever the pregnancy
intention information is missing and equals zero otherwise. Further we interact this indicator with the
birth order indicators.
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Table 3.10. Birth Order and Education - Family Fixed Effects (Pro-Life)
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.26∗∗ -0.15 -0.32∗∗
(0.10) (0.17) (0.13)
Birth Order = 3 -0.40∗∗ -0.51∗∗
(0.19) (0.23)
Male -0.38∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10)
Constant 13.57∗∗∗ 15.18∗∗∗ 12.81∗∗∗
(1.62) (2.20) (2.15)
Observations 3556 1673 1883
Mean Dependent Variable 13.62 13.80 13.47
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Covariates include maternal age at childbirth and dummy
variables indicating various age categories. Dependent variable measures completed years of education.
Subsample of individuals from families with maternal religion more strongly associated with a pro-life
stance on abortion.
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Table 3.11. Birth Order and Education - Family Fixed Effects (Pro-Choice)
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.11 0.03 -0.20
(0.14) (0.23) (0.18)
Birth Order = 3 -0.21 -0.33
(0.26) (0.30)
Male -0.71∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.18) (0.14)
Constant 10.64∗∗∗ 11.81∗∗∗ 9.79∗∗∗
(2.42) (3.10) (3.01)
Observations 1943 979 964
Mean Dependent Variable 13.85 14.13 13.57
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Covariates include maternal age at childbirth and dummy
variables indicating various age categories. Dependent variable measures completed years of education.
Subsample of individuals from families with maternal religion less strongly associated with a pro-life stance
on abortion.
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Table 3.12. Birth Order and Education within Intact Families - Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.31∗∗ -0.23 -0.38∗∗
(0.13) (0.19) (0.18)
Birth Order = 3 -0.62∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗
(0.23) (0.29)
Male -0.57∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.15) (0.14)
Constant 10.67∗∗∗ 11.98∗∗∗ 10.21∗∗∗
(1.58) (2.20) (2.28)
Observations 1933 1004 929
Mean Dependent Variable 14.49 14.68 14.30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Covariates include maternal age at childbirth and dummy
variables indicating various age categories. Dependent variable is completed years of education. Subsample
of individuals from “intact” families as defined in Section 3.4.4.
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Table 3.13. Birth Order and Good Health Before Age 17 - Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Birth Order = 3 -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.06)
Male 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 1.26∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗
(0.33) (0.44) (0.46)
Observations 3763 1868 1895
Mean Dependent Variable 0.82 0.83 0.82
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Covariates include maternal age at childbirth and dummy
variables indicating various age categories. Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a retrospective
self-assessment of own health status earlier in life (before age 17). “Very Good” and “Excellent” health
equal 1, zero otherwise.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to How Family Size in Childhood Affects
Long-Run Human Capital and Economic Opportunity
A.1 Theories on the Interaction between Child Quantity and Qual-
ity
Theoretically, a large literature in demography and economics examines the effect of family
size on children’s human capital. The quantity-quality trade-off model (Becker, 1960; Becker
and Lewis, 1973; Willis, 1973) of fertility decisions and investment in children provides a
framework for the study of family size. It conceptualizes parents’ economic behavior when
faced with a trade-off between having more children and investing more parental time and
financial resources in each child. However, to date, empirical evidence on the effects of
family size remains inconclusive (Duflo, 1998; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2005; Ca´ceres-
Delpiano, 2006). Moreover, it is unclear whether the result from a particular IV strategy can
be generalized to a broader group of individuals (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist, Lavy
and Schlosser, 2010). The concern is that public policy cannot alter twinning or the gender
of children, and the families that can be effectively targeted by policies may experience
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completely different effects than where the identification comes from. This concern seems to
be confirmed by the inconsistent estimates across instruments. For instance, Black, Devereux
and Salvanes (2010) find no significant effect of family size on children’s IQ score when using
sex composition as an instrument, but discover negative and significant estimates using twins
instead.
In the classic quantity-quality model, all children are the results of lifetime fertility decisions
made in a static setting. There are several proposed ways of expanding the quantity-quality
model. One crucial addition would be to incorporate sequentiality in fertility decisions
(Heckman and Willis, 1976) and the possibility of failure to avoid unwanted births after
deciding the ex-ante optimal number of children (Michael and Willis, 1976). Empirical
evidence on this front has been sparse, with the exception of Lin et al. (2017) who examine
the distinction between planned and unplanned increase in family size.
Families that have imperfect ability to control fertility and end up having unwanted children
after they decide to stop might experience substantial impacts on the children they already
have. Unwanted births indicate disruption in parental plans regarding child investment, and
has many documented negative impacts. A growing literature in economics and demography
shows the negative life-cycle consequences of unwanted children. Many empirical studies
leverage unique data sources that directly document pregnancy intention information from
women (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman, 2000, 2002; Miller,
2009; Lin and Pantano, 2015; Lin et al., 2017).
A.2 PSID Data and Sample Construction
My primary source of survey data is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a lon-
gitudinal survey of a nationally representative sample of U.S. individuals and families. The
PSID cross-year individual file allows this paper to construct completed years of education,
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current and retrospective self-reported health status, and labor market participation and
income in adulthood. Critical to this project, the PSID also contains valuable informa-
tion about Head Start participation in childhood, complete childbirths and adoption history
records by individual’s parents, and geo-coded county of birth and county grew up reported
by individuals.1 Crucially, the complete childbirths history records allow me to link an in-
dividual to her mother, and to the mother’s total number of children after age 40 and thus
construct the individual’s eventual total number of siblings after her mother has completed
fertility.
The PSID data is merged with the source of variation in family size – access to legal abortion
overtime across states and counties in the U.S. On the state level, in 1970, five states became
the earliest in modern U.S. history where abortion was broadly available. Abortion was then
legalized nationwide in 1973 after the Roe v. Wade decision. On the county level, I use the
abortion service provider information provided by the Guttmacher Institute. The measure of
county-level intensity accounts for within-state changes in the provision of abortion service
between 1970 and 1979.
A.3 State-Level Variation in Abortion and Family Size
Appendix Table A.1 presents the magnitude of the estimates. Cohorts that are affected
during the variation of abortion access are put into bins of being conceived between 1967
and 1969, and between 1970 and 1972.2 Among all individuals and using my preferred
specification (column 3 and column 6), having access to legal abortion one to three years
after birth reduces number of younger siblings on average by 0.271. It also reduces chances
1County-level geo-code analysis requires approval to use PSID restricted data in the MICDA enclave.
2Year of conception is constructed using year of birth and month of birth. It is set as one year before
birth when the month of birth is between January and May. Although many children born after May are
also conceived in the previous year, I assume for them access abortion is still possible if abortion becomes
legal in their year of birth. The results are robust to different definitions of year conceived.
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of ever having any younger sibling by 9 percentage points. The estimate appears to be
robust to the addition of individual-level covariates and state and year of birth fixed effects.
When stratifying by birth order, results appear to be similar albeit less precise, indicating
a statistically significant treatment effect not driven by a change of composition of the
families.3
3Note that the estimates tend to be smaller for the later-borns. This is not surprising given that they
have fewer younger siblings than the first-borns on average.
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Figure A.1. Difference in Number of Siblings, Early-Legalizing vs. Other States, by Family
Background
129
Notes: Sample includes individuals in PSID cross-year individual file and Childbirth and Adoption
History File whose mother last reported number of children after the age of 40. Point estimates of
year-of-birth indicator interacted with repeal-state indicator are plotted. Covariates include gender,
indicators of mother’s race, mother’s age at birth, and categorical variables of maternal completed
education. Regression controls for year of birth and state of birth fixed effects. Confidence intervals
presented are on the 90% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the state
level are used.
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Table A.1. Abortion Legalization and Younger Siblings - Regression
Notes: Sample includes individuals in PSID cross-year individual file and Childbirth and Adoption
History File born between 1965 and 1983 whose mother last reported number of children after the
age of 40. Regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the state level.
Column 2 includes control variables for mother’s race and age at birth M, individual’s gender G,
and indicator of born in early-repeal states S, and indicators of different birth cohort bins Y.
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Table A.3. Abortion Provider Roll-Out and 1970 County Characteristics
Notes: Unweighted averages are reported. Column 5 includes counties that had first abortion
service provider between 1970 and 1988. Source: 1970 County and City Data Book.
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Table A.4. State-Level Analysis of Family Size and Head Start Interaction
Notes: Sample includes individuals in PSID cross-year individual file and Childbirth and Adoption
History File born between 1960 and 1980 whose mother last reported number of children after
the age of 40. Covariates include gender, indicators of mother’s race, mother’s age at birth, and
categorical variables of maternal completed education. Regressions also include for indicator of
Head Start interacted separately with repeal, conceived in 1967-69, conceived in 1970-72, as well as
year of birth and state of birth fixed effects, resulting in a fully interacted specification. Confidence
intervals presented are on the 90% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on
the state level are used.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to The Long-Run Impacts of Head Start on
Human Capital and Economic Self-Sufficiency
B.1 Census Data
The project’s primary data source is the 2000 Census and 2001 to 2013 ACS combined
with the SSA’s Numident file, accessed through project 1284 in the University of Michigan
Research Data Center (RDC). The advantage of these data is that they link a rich set of
productivity outcomes for cohorts potentially benefitting from War on Poverty programs
(those who are ages 25 to 54 in the Census/ACS) with information on their access to Head
Start programs in childhood using Numident information on county of birth. The 2000
census long-form contains information on 16.7 percent of the U.S. population; the 2001 to
2013 ACSs contain information for around 14 percent of the U.S. population. The number
of Numidentlinked, unique individuals in these combined data sources represent about one-
quarter of the U.S. population. In addition, we use the 1970 restricted long-form Census that
contains information on school enrollment for children. Unfortunately, these data cannot be
linked to the Numident because they have not yet been PIK’d by the Census.
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B.2 SSA’s Numident: Data on County and Date of Birth
Links from the Census/ACS to place and date of birth are important for studying the
long-term impacts of Head Start, as place and date of birth provide crucial information on
exposure of individuals to these programs in early childhood. For the Census/ACS files we
use the survey-internal PIK code to match individuals with the SSA’s Numident file. The
Numident place-of-birth variable is a string variable detailing, in most cases, the city and
state of birth. In previous work, Isen et al. (2013) developed a matching algorithm to con-
nect this string variable to the Census Bureau database of places, counties, and minor civil
divisions as well as the United States Geological Survey’s Geographic Names Information
System (GNIS) file. We also make use of code that was developed for a similar purpose
by Black et al. (2015). Using both sources, we constructed a crosswalk between the NU-
MIDENT place of birth string variable and (standard) county FIPS codes, with over 90
percent of individuals matched to their counties of birth. Taylor et al. (2016)’s technical
memorandum has been posted with the Census Bureau and contains this information.
The Census/ACS data have the benefit of providing a wide range of outcomes of interest, in-
cluding individual earnings, but also program participation, disability, living arrangements,
and family and household variables such as income and poverty. Additionally, we observe
individuals in all states and we observe individuals regardless of whether they are employed.
The Census/ACS data also have limitations. They are repeated cross-sections and informa-
tion is self-reported (and, so, measured with error).
B.3 Data on School Age Entry Cutoffs
We restrict our sample to individuals who were born in areas where we have information for
the relevant school-entry age cut-offs. This information is taken from Bedard and Dhuey
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(2012) and supplemented using our own research for two states. According to state legislative
documents, the school-entry age cutoff for the entire state of Texas was September 1st
starting in 1969.1 The state of Kansas’ cutoff date is January 1st before 1965.2
We omit areas from our analysis sample where we are missing information on school entry
cutoffs. This includes all individuals born in Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Montana before 1979, New Jersey, Rhode Island before 1967, South Carolina before 1978,
Texas before 1969, Utah, Washington before 1977, and West Virginia before 1972. In our
robustness checks, we find that the inclusion of these states and cohorts using a generic
school-entry age cutoff tends to attenuate the estimates, as one might expect in the case of
classical measurement error.
B.4 Data on Head Start
To study the long-run impacts of access to Head Start, we also use additional county-level
sources of data to account for potentially confounding local programs and the economy.
These data include information from the following sources: Bailey and Goodman-Bacon
(2015) collected data on the OEO’s community programs from the National Archives Com-
munity Action Program (NACAP) files, as well as from some administrative sources. For
Community Health Centers, some information was hand-entered from annual Public Health
Service (PHS) Reports. The resulting database contains information on (1) the county where
a program delivered services, which allows each federal grant to be linked to county-level
mortality rates; (2) the date that each county received its first program services grant (this
excludes planning grants), which provides the year that programs began operating; and (3)
some information on program grants between 1978 and 1980 from the National Archives
1http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.ssl/sstx0163&size=
2&collection=ssl&id=718
2http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.ssl/ssks0074&size=
2&collection=ssl&id=477
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Federal Outlays (NAFO) files. We supplement these data with information on the legal ser-
vices program from Cunningham (2013) and Food Stamps from Hoynes and Schanzenbach
(2009).
B.5 Data on Head Start Launch Dates
Our main policy variable is the availability of the Head Start program, which was rolled
out across counties during the War on Poverty. Bailey and Duquette (2014) and Bailey and
Goodman-Bacon (2015) have compiled information from the National Archives and Records
Administration on changes in Head Start funding between 1965 and 1980, which we use in
this study. To verify their accuracy, these data have been compared to federal government
directories of Head Start programs (Project Head Start 1971, Office of Child Development
1973, Project Head Start 1978). The following tables and figures supplement the analysis
and description in the paper with more information on the roll-out of the program.
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Table B.1. Share of Counties and Children under 6 in County with Head Start, 1965-1980
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Table B.2. 1960 County Characteristics and Head Start’s Launch, 1965-1980
Notes: All values are population-weighted means, with the exception of average county population in row
1. Characteristics are for 1960 unless otherwise specified. All variables are taken from the 1960 County and
City Databooks (Haines et al. 2010) and 1990 Area Resource Files (US DHHS 1994) except the following.
Medicare variables are for 1966, taken from the County-level Medicare File (US SSA 1969-1977; US HFA
1978-1980). Data on Medicare expenditures were shared by Almond, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2011). We
also use the 1959 to 1988 Vital Statistics Multiple-Cause of Death Files (US DHHS and NCHS 2007) to
compute mortality rates.
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Table B.3. Regression Analysis of 1960 County Characteristics and Head Start’s Launch, 1965-
1980
Notes: We estimate each regression by ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is year of Head
Start’s launch. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are beneath the point estimates in brackets. The
regressions exclude counties that never received Head Start funding and are unweighted. Characteristics are
for 1960 unless otherwise specified. Covariates without point estimate in the table include state fixed effects
(S), urban categories (U, 0, 0 < u ≤ 25, 25 ≤ u < 50, 50 ≤ u < 75, 75 ≤ u ≤ 100, where u is the share of a
county’s population living in an urban area), and log population (P). See also Table B.2 notes.
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Table B.4. Age at Launch by Cohort and Year Head Start Launched
Notes: Table documents the age at Head Start’s launch for each birth cohort and Head Start launch date in
our data. Noteworthy is that our sample is compositionally balanced from ages -1 to 15, which we present
in our event study graphical analysis. Outside of those ranges, the set of counties and birth cohorts will not
be compositionally balanced.
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B.6 The Effect of a Head Start Launch on Head Start Enroll-
ment
Figure B.1 shows the unadjusted enrollment gap in the public IPUMS data between counties
that had a Head Start program in 1970 versus those that did not. Notably, four-year-old
children in counties without Head Start programs were 3.4 percentage points less likely to be
enrolled in school (16.8pp versus 20.2pp). Five-year-old children were 17 percentage points
less likely to be enrolled in school (48.9 versus 65.9). In the public data, these gaps are 5.9
percentage points among 4 year olds and 21.3 percentage points among 5 year olds when
looking only at children of mothers with less than a high school education.3
3Note that Head Start was not exclusively for poor kids in the 1960s and 1970s. To encourage interaction
between poor children and those from less disadvantaged backgrounds, OEO policy allowed 15 percent, and
later 10 percent, of children to come from families that did not meet its poverty criteria. Roughly two-thirds
of children in the full-year 1969 and 1970 programs came from families in which the mother had less than a
high school education, although the mothers of about 7 percent of children had attended or graduated from
college.
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Figure B.1. 1970 School Enrollment by Mother’s Education
Notes: The figure plots the predicted school enrollment by age for children in counties with Head Start
versus those in counties without Head Start in 1970. These predictions come from a linear-probability model
regression using a dependent variable is equal to one if a child was enrolled in school on February 1, 1970.
Because the most detailed level of geography available in the public-use data is county group, availability of
Head Start is operationalized as the population-weighted share of counties in an individual’s county group
that had Head Start by the 1969-1970 school year. The sample is limited to states where the school-entry
cutoff falls at the beginning of a quarter and includes children between school age 2 and 7 using the school-
entry age cutoff date in 1969. Source: Authors’ calculations using the public 1970 Census (Ruggles et al.,
2017), because we have not yet disclosed this figure in the restricted 1970 Census.
We explore these gaps in more detail using the restricted 1970 Census, which allows us to use
a 1 in 6 sample of the U.S. population and county of residence (rather than county group).
Using exact county rather than country group is more analogous to the long-term outcomes
in the Census/ACS analysis. We compare school enrollment by a child’s age in 1970 after
adjusting for different county characteristics using either covariates or county fixed effects
using the following specification:
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SchoolEnrollmentic = Z
′
cβ0 +A
′
iβ1 +A
′
iHeadStartcβ2 + ic (B.1)
whereAi has elements indicating the child’s age relative to the school entry cut-off; HeadStartc
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county had a Head Start program funded before 1970
(and is zero for places receiving their program in fiscal year 1971 or later). The set of
covariates, Zc, includes either (1) θs(c), which captures state fixed effects to account for age-
invariant, state-level factors that determine the local supply of preschools as well as 1960
county characteristics (share of county population in urban areas, in rural areas, under 5
years of age, 65 or older, nonwhite, with 12 or more years of education, with less than 4
years of education, in households with income less than $3,000, in households with incomes
greater than $10,000, local government expenditures, income per capita, and whether the
county was among the 300 poorest counties) or (2) county-level fixed effects (pic). The point
estimates of interest are the elements of β2, which, after regression-adjusting for county
characteristics, capture differences in school enrollment rates of likely eligible children ages
4 to 5 in counties with Head Start.
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Table B.5. Regression-Adjusted Relationship between Head Start and Enrollment
Notes: Sample is limited to children in states where we observe a school age entry cutoff, and where the school
entry cutoff coincides with the beginning or end of a calendar quarter. Access to Head Start is measured as
equal to 1 if a child lives in a county with a Head Start program in the 1969-70 school year. Observation
counts are rounded per disclosure requirements. Omitted category is children age 7.75. Standard errors in
brackets are clustered by county. Source: Authors calculations using the restricted 1970 Census.
The regression-adjusted, preschool enrollment gaps are summarized in Table B.5. School
enrollment was 29 percent higher for all five year olds (0.149/0.52), 29 percent higher for
boys (0.151/0.52) and 28 percent higher for girls (0.145/0.52). Although we are unable to
assess many potential threats to the internal validity of this cross-sectional research design,
the high degree of robustness of these estimates to the inclusion of different covariates in
columns (2) and (3) is encouraging.
Our best estimate of the effect of a Head Start program from the 1970 Census on a birth
cohort’s exposure to Head Start is around 14.9 percentage points (Table B.5, column 3).
It is 0.151 for men (column 4) and 0.145 for women (column 5). By construction, Census
estimates should omit summer Head Start. An additional advantage of using the Census
estimates is that they provide standard errors, which we use in our parametric bootstrap to
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scale our ITT estimates into ATETs.
Census estimates accord well with administrative data and are comparable to other studies.
Administrative data suggest that in 1971, the average Head Start program served about 10
percent of resident 4-year-olds, which compares very well to around the 9 percent increase in
school attendance in 1970 in the Census. The similarity of these administrative numbers and
Census estimates suggests that crowd-out is minimal. To the extent that interested readers
believe the estimate of the first stage should be higher or lower, they can deflate or inflate
our ATET estimates accordingly.
B.7 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Head Start with the NLSY-79
A full accounting of the costs and benefits of Head Start is outside the scope of this paper.
However, for comparison purposes, we compute the cumulative benefits of Head Start on
economic opportunity through the program’s cumulative effects on earnings potential. This
is important in our context because Head Start appears to influence men and women’s work
effort, making the sample of wage earners selected. Our use of potential earnings follows
Neal and Johnson (1996) and is directly comparable with Deming (2009). Like Deming,
we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to predict wages for
individuals born from 1957 to 1965 (ages 14 to 22 in 1979) – a time frame that overlaps our
Census/ACS analysis. The NLSY data allow us to estimate the relationship between wages
and components of the human capital and economic self-sufficiency indices after flexibly
controlling for ability using the AFQT. Although AFQT is not available in the Census/ACS,
using this as a covariate helps mitigate omitted variables bias in ability in the education
and earnings relationship. We use observations on respondents’ labor market wage income
between 2002 and 2014, when they are between ages 35 and 57 years old, adjusted to be in
2013 dollars. We implement the following regression:
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ln(Wagesi) = HC
′
iβ1 +ESS
′
iβ2 +X
′
iβ3 + i (B.2)
where Xi is a vector of race, gender, age, survey year dummy variables and a quadratic in
the respondent’s standardized and age-normalized AFQT score (as in Deming (2009), Neal
and Johnson (1996)). In some specifications, Xi includes Deming’s covariates of age 19
outcomes as regressors to account for potential sources of omitted variables bias, which has
a negligible effect on our calculations. We also include new outcomes that were contained in
our human capital (HC) and economic self-sufficiency indices (ESS).
Note, however, that we omit components of the ESS that are directly related to log wages
such as poverty and log family income. The resulting regression coefficients capture the
importance of each index component after accounting flexibly for AFQT. Table B.6 (next
page) shows that the results are generally very similar with and without Deming’s covariates
(columns 1-3 versus columns 4-6). Panel A summarizes the internal rate of return (IRR)
using the estimated cost of Head Start per student of around $5,400 and either the (1)
realized human capital and self-sufficiency gains at ages 25 to 64 or the (2) savings in public
assistance outlays. We present the regression estimates underlying the calculations in (1) in
panel B.
In terms of the human capital and self-sufficiency returns only, we find an IRR to Head Start
of 7.7 percent averaged over men and women (Panel A, column 1). The IRR ranges from
around 4 percent for women to 11 percent for men (columns 2-3), owing both to the fact that
women’s human capital gains are smaller and that their labor-force effort falls in response
to Head Start. Note, that this approach calculates only some of the private benefits that
accrue to individuals and does not include benefits through improvements in outcomes not
measured here. For instance, the extent to which more education engenders better health,
148
longevity, or well-being is ignored in these calculations.
The human capital and self-sufficiency calculations also ignore savings on public assistance
expenditures. The 2000 Census and 2001-2013 ACS suggest that the average amount of
dollars received by public assistance recipients between ages 25 and 54 was $8,700 per year
in 2013 dollars, which is 15 percent smaller than in the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) of $9,967 due to misreporting. Using the SIPP calculation, the IRR on
putting one child through Head Start is 2.4% overall if the only returns to Head Start were
in savings in public assistance expenditures: 2.5% for men and 2.2% for women.
Adding increases in tax revenues or subtracting deadweight loss encumbered by redistribut-
ing these expenditures through the tax and welfare system would serve to increase these
estimates.
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Table B.6. The Effect of Human Capital and Self-Sufficiency on Adult Earnings Potential
Notes: The dependent variable is log wage income. Control variables not reported in the table include race,
gender, and birth and survey year fixed effects. High school completion, college completion, and professional
or doctoral degree indicate completed years of education is greater or equal to 12, 16, or 18, respectively.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are beneath the point estimates in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level to account for longitudinal dependence in the data.
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B.8 Additional Estimates
The following tables present estimates by race and sex for both human capital and economic
self-sufficiency. We omit these from the paper because they are imprecise for nonwhites,
largely owing to the fact that nonwhite children comprise around 15 percent of the sample.
In addition, smaller sample sizes for these subgroups suggest relying on the parameterized
spline estimate rather than the event-study point estimate at age -1.
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Table B.7. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Human Capital by Race
Notes: In column 1, the control mean and standard deviation are calculated using the cohorts ages 6 and
7 at the time Head Start was launched. Column 2 presents the estimated intention-to-treat (ITT) effect
evaluated at birth cohort of full exposure (-1, see Figure 2.2). Columns 3 and 7 compute the percentage
increase implied by the ITT or ATET, respectively, estimate relative to the control mean (the ratio of column
2 or 6 to column 1) for components of the index. Column 4 presents the ITT spline estimate evaluated at
-1. Column 5 presents the F-statistic and p-value for the test of a trend-break in the spline at age 6. The
ATET estimate in column 6 divides the ITT effect at -1 by the estimate of receiving a Head Start grant on
school enrollment at school age 5 – 0.149 (s.e. 0.022) for the full sample, see Appendix Table B.5).
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Table B.8. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Human Capital by Race: White Men and Women
Notes: See Table B.7 notes.
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Table B.9. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Human Capital by Race: Nonwhite Men and
Women
Notes: See Table B.7 notes.
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Table B.10. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Self-Sufficiency by Race
Notes: See Table B.7 notes.
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Table B.11. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Self-Sufficiency by Race and Race-Sex: White
Women and Men
Notes: See Table B.7 notes.
156
Table B.12. The Effect of Head Start on Adult Self-Sufficiency by Race and Race-Sex: Nonwhite
Women and Men
Notes: See Table B.7 notes.
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Table B.13. The Effect of Head Start on Incarceration and Mortality
Notes: See Table B.7 notes.
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Table B.14. The Effect of Head Start on the Human Capital Index using Different Measures of
Access
Notes: There are 14,800,000 individuals (rounded for disclosure) in each regression. Panel A presents the
results from specifications that exclude state-by-year-of birth fixed effects as is necessary in longitudinal
samples. Panel B presents the results from specifications that exclude state-by-year-of-birth fixed effects as
is necessary in longitudinal samples. The only change in the specification is the specification of the variable
used to measure access to Head Start. Column 1 repeats the value shown in the paper. Column 2 presents
a differences-in-differences specification, where Head Start=1 in a county for all children younger than 6
when it began. Column 3 uses a specification that measures share of the three potential years of access in
which a child lived in a county with a Head Start program and was age eligible (possible variable values
are 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1). Column 4 uses the Thompson (2017) measure of Head Start access as average
per-year, per-capita Head Start spending in the three years when an individual was between 3 and 6 years
old. Column 5 uses the Johnson and Jackson (2017) measure of Head Start access as Head Start spending
per poor 4-year-old, as defined when the cohort was 4 years old.
Table B.15. The Effect of Head Start on the Self-Sufficiency Index using Different Measures of
Access
Notes: See Table B.14 notes.
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Table B.16. The Effect of Head Start on Completed High School or GED using Different Measures
of Access
Notes: See Table B.14 notes.
Table B.17. The Effect of Head Start on Enrolled in College using Different Measures of Accesss
Notes: See Table B.14 notes.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Birth Order and Unwanted Fertility
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Table C.2. Birth Order and Employment - Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.04 0.00 -0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Birth Order = 3 -0.05 -0.13∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
Male 0.01 -0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.02 -0.02 0.05
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Age Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.50 0.98 0.25
(0.49) (0.81) (0.61)
Observations 2273 1169 1104
Mean Dependent Variable 0.86 0.87 0.84
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Age refers to age the child (now an adult) in the year 2011.
Dependent Variable measures employment in 2011.
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Table C.3. Birth Order and Employment in Families with Evidence of Perfect Fertility Control -
Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 0.01 0.07 -0.05
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Birth Order = 3 0.06 -0.08
(0.08) (0.08)
Male 0.02 0.01 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Age 0.04 0.06 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Age Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.13 -0.92 0.97
(0.89) (1.25) (1.32)
Observations 924 615 309
Mean Dependent Variable 0.90 0.91 0.89
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Age refers to age the child (now an adult) in the year 2011.
Dependent Variable measures employment in 2011.
164
Table C.4. Birth Order and Employment in families without Evidence of Perfect Fertility Control
- Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.08∗ -0.07 -0.11∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
Birth Order = 3 -0.13∗ -0.15∗
(0.07) (0.09)
Male 0.01 -0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Age 0.03 -0.07 0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Age Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.59 2.32∗∗ 0.06
(0.61) (1.00) (0.73)
Observations 1349 554 795
Mean Dependent Variable 0.83 0.82 0.83
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Age refers to age the child (now an adult) in the year 2011.
Dependent Variable measures employment in 2011.
165
Table C.5. Birth Order and Employment Accounting for Unwantedness - Family Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.04 -0.00 -0.07∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Birth Order = 3 -0.02 -0.09
(0.05) (0.07)
Unwanted 0.06 0.13 0.04
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07)
Male 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.99∗ 0.71 1.05
(0.53) (0.86) (0.68)
Observations 2273 1169 1104
Mean Dependent Variable 0.86 0.87 0.84
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Age refers to age the child (now an adult) in the year 2011.
Dependent Variable measures employment in 2011.
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Table C.6. Birth Order and Employment - Family Fixed Effects (Pro-Life)
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.05 0.02 -0.11∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Birth Order = 3 -0.06 -0.17∗∗
(0.07) (0.08)
Male -0.01 -0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Age 0.02 -0.04 0.05
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Age Squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.56 1.30 0.36
(0.66) (1.04) (0.84)
Observations 1312 656 656
Mean Dependent Variable 0.86 0.86 0.87
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Age refers to age the child (now an adult) in the year 2011.
Dependent Variable measures employment in 2011. Subsample of individuals from families with maternal
religion more strongly associated with a pro-life stance on abortion.
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Table C.7. Birth Order and Employment - Family Fixed Effects (Pro-Choice)
(1) (2) (3)
2- and 3-Child
Families
2-Child
Families
3-Child
Families
Birth Order = 2 -0.04 0.01 -0.08
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Birth Order = 3 -0.02 -0.08
(0.08) (0.12)
Male 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Age 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Age Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.23 0.02 0.25
(0.98) (1.51) (1.29)
Observations 961 513 448
Mean Dependent Variable 0.84 0.87 0.81
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the family level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Omitted category is first-born child. Age refers to age the child (now an adult) in the year 2011.
Dependent Variable measures employment in 2011. Subsample of individuals from families with maternal
religion less strongly associated with a pro-life stance on abortion.
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